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Abstract
An intelligent transportation system (ITS) provides improved transport efficiency and safety based on vehicle communication. Connected and automated
vehicles (CAVs) as part of an ITS are projected to revolutionize the transportation industry, primarily by allowing real-time and seamless information exchange between vehicles and roadside infrastructure. Although these CAVs
are expected to offer vast benefits, new problems in terms of safety, security,
and privacy will also emerge. Since CAVs continue to rely heavily on vehicle
sensors and information obtained from other vehicles and roadside units, abnormal sensors and malicious cyber attacks can lead to destructive results and
fatal crashes. Therefore, ensuring reliable and secure information dissemination across vehicles and roadside units is vital for many applications and in the
safety-critical aspect of CAVs. As a result, mechanisms that can detect anomalies and identify attack sources in real- time are necessary before the mass deployment of CAVs. This dissertation designs an approach for anomaly detection by utilizing deep Learning (DL), and machine learning ( ML) mechanisms,
namely Bayesian deep learning (BDL) empowered with discrete wavelet transform (DWT), to detect and identify abnormal behavior in CAVs. The proposed
approach’s numerical experiment shows high performance in detecting anomalies and identifying their scores with high accuracy, sensitivity, precision, and
F1 − score. Furthermore, this proposed method outperforms baseline BDL and
convolutional neural network (CNN) approaches in detecting and identifying

vii

anomalies. Performance-wise, the proposed approach is evaluated in terms of
the following performance metrics: sensitivity, precision, and F1 − score. Based
on the simulation, the proposed approach achieves performance gains of 6.98 %,
9.10 %, and 7.37 % over CNN and 11.89 %, 7.32 %, and 9.37 % over BDL at duration d = 3 and linspace(0, 6000) for the difficult gradual drift anomaly.
In another work, a new architecture of ML-Based Trust (MLBT) mechanism
in detecting adversary behaviors in a vehicular-based M2M-C (VBM2M-C)
framework is proposed. A combination of extreme Gradient Boost (XGBoost)
and binary particle swarm optimization (BPSO) is introduced to detect and
identify malicious behaviors within the network.

The proposed MLBT is

evaluated over different probabilities of attacks. The results of this evaluation
show that the proposed approach outperforms the state-of-the-art mechanisms
by 10 % inaccuracy, 9 % in true positive rate (tpr), and lowers false positive rate
(fpr) by 9 %, 10 % in precision, 8.10 % in recall, 9.3 % in sensitivity, and 10 % in
F1 − score with reference to the attacker density of 30 % in the selected metrics
better than the compared approaches.
Moreover, an innovative data-driven approach was equally developed,
which involves the combination of discrete wavelet transform (DWT) and
double deep Q network (DDQN) method for anomaly detection in CAVs. The
DDQN is modified to accommodate classification by taking the state’s data
feature while labeling as the action. The features in DWT and DDQN are
combined to enhance anomaly detection performance in CAV networks. The
DWT smoothens the basic safety messages (BSMs) sensor reading before the
BSMs are fed into the DDQN approach. F1 − score and sensitivity are used to
access the performance of the proposed method. Overall, the proposed method
achieves a performance gain of 20 % and 10 % at a small density of anomaly
distribution and 12 % and 8 % at a high density of anomaly distribution for
ensemble multilayer perceptron (EMLP) and support vector machine (SVM).
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) as part of intelligent transportation systems (ITSs) are emerging technology, where a large number of vehicles
can collect, process, and communicate information through vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications, to make collaborative decisions without direct human intervention [1].
CAV is projected to provide significant economic and life-saving benefits to
the transportation industry. In the United States (US) alone, as of 2018, traffic
accidents caused 36,473 deaths, and traffic congestion contributed to the loss
of about 115 billion USD [2]. These traffic accidents and economic loss can
be significantly reduced with vehicular communications [3]. Such a high rate
of traffic accidents has prompted researchers to make significant efforts to investigate many aspects of vehicular communication [3]. That is why Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) has allocated 75 MHz bandwidth for CAV
applications in the US. One of the technologies that deliver CAV is dedicated
short-range communications (DSRCs), and the other one is cellular-based cellular vehicle to everything (C-V2X). A similar spectrum is allocated to other parts
of the world for CAVs. Further, standards such as IEEE 1609.1– IEEE 1609.4
were designed to provide active safety and enhance the driver experience [4].
1

Those IEEE standards define physical (PHY), medium access control (MAC),
and security and application layers [3]. In addition to IEEE standards, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) standards, such as J2735, J2945, and J3161,
define the protocol and application layers specifications for CAVs. Among those
protocols and messages, one of the most critical ones is basic safety messages
(BSMs), which communicate important information about the state of the vehicle, such as acceleration, heading, Global Position System (GPS) coordinates,
speed, and braking [5]. BSMs are created at the rate of 10 messages per second (m/s) to accurately alert and warn remote vehicles (RVs) about the state of
the host vehicles (HVs) for safety and emergency applications such as forward
collision warning.
It has been reported that, any disruption and attacks on these safety messaging applications can potentially have deadly consequences [6]. To prevent
CAV applications from those disruptions and attacks, disseminated information should be trustworthy (i.e., correct) and anomaly-free. To authenticate the
senders and provide integrity, BSMs must be signed. However, a certified and
authorized device might be compromised or tampered by malicious users to
deliver inaccurate and malicious information. Even worse, malicious users can
group to coordinate their efforts to attack the network to inflict accidents. As of
today, identifying a malicious user in these networks is an active research area.

1.1

Trust Related Challenges in CAV

The concept of trust has received extensive attention in different disciplines,
such as philosophy, sociology, and politics, as one of the primary factors in
decision- making [7], [8]. Trust is defined as the receiving vehicle’s opinion
on how honest the sending vehicle is in reporting its state. It is considered as
soft security since it is subjective and can be described in different ways. For
example, a binary trust can be defined as "1" or "0"; a multilevel trust can be

2

represented as Level 1, Level 2,..., Level n, as values between [-1, 1], or as probabilistic measure with values between [0, 1].
Trust evaluation is categorized into three models: entity-centric trust (ECT),
data-centric trust (DCT), and hybrid model. In the ECT model, trust is defined
as an integration of multiple factors about the entity. In other words, trust is
established on the vehicles. However, the model has numerous drawbacks simply because of its time-invariant nature [9]. In this case, a valuable amount of
time is taken for a receiving vehicle to establish a decision about a given vehicle. Furthermore, ECT involves rounds of complex iterations, resulting in the
system’s high detection latency. The ECT can be exploited within the dynamic
vehicular networks [10], [11].
In the ECT model, a decision is made based on the interaction among vehicles. Decision-making in this context involves the combination of direct trust,
recommended trust, and previous experience of the receiving vehicle about a
reporting vehicle. Here, decision-making might incur delays since a receiving
vehicle only takes a final decision after gathering information from these three
sources: direct trust, recommended trust, and previous history.
However, most emerging mobile networking technologies are mainly datacentric [11] since it is relatively easy to establish trust in the data rather than the
reporting vehicles. For instance, in a CAV, the vehicle’s identity as a security
measure in ECT has no contribution in the update of the events and status of the
vehicles in the network [10], [11]. DCT uses alert messages like safety warnings,
traffic information update, time freshness, and location relevance to provide
valuable information about the vehicular network state.
Integrating basic safety message’s (BSM’s) correlations in DCT will give
more insight into malicious activities in the vehicular networks. These BSM
correlations are effectively used for trust modeling and the detection of attacks.
The numerous attributes to measure trust are speed correlation with break
status, vehicular density with speed, distance of observing a vehicle to an event
3

(such as an accident), and information report of incidence in the network.

1.2

Motivation

The CAV communication network is susceptible to severe attacks and privacy
challenges. Moreover, robust methods that can effectively identify malicious
and inaccurate information in the CAV network have not been well explored.
However, since security and reliability are extremely important for the efficiency of CAV applications, CAV safety and emergency applications must receive correct and secure information to operate reliably to achieve their objectives.
Misinformation and disruption in a CAV network may result in accidents,
traffic congestion, and many other undesirable consequences. Hence, the dissemination of information must be secure and anomaly-free, so the receiver
must trust this to act on it. BSMs are signed to authenticate the sender and
to verify the message integrity. However, a certified device might be compromised and tampered with by malicious users. Compromised certified users can
send incorrect information to create problems in the communication network.
Even worse, malicious users can collaborate to coordinate their efforts to attack
the transportation network, thereby inflicting substantial damage.

1.3

Problem Statement

CAV network consists of many moving vehicles and is extremely dynamic;
therefore, it poses numerous problems for communicating vehicles [12]. Such
dynamic network topology results in a partitioned network with isolated vehicles and short-lived links among vehicles and roadside units (RSUs). This
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dynamic network coupled with possible malicious vehicles makes it more challenging to estimate correct information and detect attackers at the receiving
end [12].
Moreover, vehicles in the CAV network may share information to warn others about their location, work zones, or traffic conditions. This sharing informs
neighboring vehicles about the state of the traffic condition. The efficiency
of these CAV applications depends on the availability of continuous and reliable information about vehicles’ status in terms of parameters such as location,
speed, and direction [13].
CAVs use this information for vital decision-making, such as optimizing
route, preventing congestion, ensuring safety, and avoiding accidents. However, misbehaving CAVs will often constitute a critical problem in the integrity
of such vital decision-making applications. Consequently, relying on those incorrect messages can cause life-threatening cases.
Traditional safety mechanisms, such as cryptographic algorithms, coupled with preventive security countermeasures are inadequate to protect
CAVs against attackers [14], as they cannot always guarantee that data are
correct [15], [16]. Thus, the identification of misbehavior is one of the most important defense mechanisms that can thwart such threats. Several approaches
exist to identify malicious information in CAVs, such as entity-centric (EC)
and data-centric (DC) approaches. EC approach is obtained from the past
behaviors of the sender vehicle and its reputation among its neighbors [4].
However, this approach has the disadvantages of being time-invariant and
slow in decision-making [17].
On the other hand, the DC approach depends on the message’s consistency
and plausibility [18], [19]. However, most of those proposals are based on static
rules built on the predefined context; attackers can easily circumvent those rules
and carry out undetected attacks. Moreover, current defense mechanisms are
designed for a specific attack and cannot be generalized [20]. Consequently, the
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existing solutions for detecting misbehavior suffer from high false alarms and
low detection levels due to ignorance of the complexity of the vehicular environment and assumptions that do not reflect the reality of CAV attributes [9].

1.4

Research Objectives

As discussed in the Motivation and Problem Statement sections, providing robust approaches to mitigate misbehavior and identify attacks is vital to ensuring
the sound and long-term operation of CAVs. Therefore, this research strives to
achieve the following goals:
1. Developing and designing efficient misbehavior detection mechanism using machine learning (ML) and discrete wavelet transform (DWT) of time
series of data to improve the overall attack/anomaly detection performance of CAV networks.
2. Performing extensive simulation analysis to investigate the effects
of anomaly types, density, and duration in single- and multipleattack/anomaly scenarios in the CAV networks.
3. Presenting a comparative study of different anomaly detection approaches that critically monitor the network in the context of CAV and
machine-to-machine M2M technology. Specifically, providing an in-depth
evaluation of ML, deep learning (DL), and deep reinforcement learning
(DRL) approach to detect misbehavior in CAV and M2M networks.
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1.5

Research Contributions

This thesis undertakes an end-to-end study on critical safety concerns in CAVs
and M2M communication applications after a comprehensive literature review.
Anomaly and misbehavior detection ability in a CAV is investigated by providing robust ML and DL approaches. The thesis contributions can be summarized
as follows:
1. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first or one of the few that
have developed and extensively evaluated single and multiple anomalies/attacks in the CAV context. The multiple anomaly framework is illustrated using a real-life environment where several anomalies/attacks
are prevalent.
2. Our proposed approaches are capable of providing robust detection and
identification of anomaly and type, and filters noise in the messages.
3. We present a comparative study of different anomaly detection approaches that critically monitor the network in the context of both CAV
and M2M. Specifically, we provide an in-depth evaluation of ML, DL, and
DRL approaches to detect misbehavior in CAV and M2M networks.
4. We propose an optimized Bayesian deep learning (BDL), double deep Q
learning (DDQN), with discrete wavelet transform (DWT) and extreme
gradient boost (XGBoost) enhanced binary particle swarm optimization
(BPSO), approach that not only provides reliable anomaly detection but
also is scalable to the changing density of the CAV and M2M networks.
5. We present extensive simulation results to investigate the effects of varying anomaly distributions, duration, incident rate, and type in a CAV setting.
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1.6

Organization of the Thesis

Chapter 2 provides background and review of relevant publications and ideas.
Chapter 3 presents the evaluation methodology for misbehavior formulation
and detection. Chapter 4 describes the misbehavior detection for CAV and
M2M based on ML. Chapter 5 presents the results and discussions. Chapter
6 concludes the thesis and speculates on the future research opportunities.
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Chapter 2

Literature Review on Detection
Approaches and Related Works
CAV security and privacy is a broad topic involving multiple subjects such
as the system architecture, deployments and platforms with different requirements, attackers with varying motivations, levels of abilities, and complexities
of threats and countermeasures [3].
A comprehensive analysis of CAV security and privacy is required to recognize the most relevant issues and identify avenues for innovation to be embraced and implemented in the automotive industry. Therefore, in this study,
relevant issues related to detection mechanisms of traditional security techniques, such as cryptography and DC and EC detection, are reviewed.

2.1

Connected Autonomous Vehicles

CAV is one of the key developments in the field of ITS. The CAV communication can provide and enhance safety, environmental sustainability, and user
experience. The CAV framework combines the advantages of connected vehicle
(CV) and autonomous vehicle (AV) technologies [21].
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CAV technology allows the communication and cooperation between vehicles and infrastructure to share vital messages such as speed, location, acceleration, brake condition, and traffic signaling. One of the important messages in
V2V is BSMs, which broadcast vehicles’ vital information to surrounding vehicles and infrastructure. The V2V communication range is approximately 400
meters at line of sight (LOS) [21]–[25]. V2V will complement currently available AV sensors such as radar and vision to detect other vehicles and identify
hazardous conditions.
The movement towards CAVs will eliminate vehicle accidents, reduce injuries and fatalities, improve fuel economy, and provide better traffic flow efficiency. However, the connected computing infrastructure of CAV is likely to be
vulnerable to attacks. Recent studies have identified vulnerabilities associated
with various sensors, controls, and communication mechanisms [21].
A thorough road test study shows many open problems associated with
CAV technology [26], [27]. It is essential that vehicles cooperate among themselves and share reliable information about the current update of events in a
CAV network. Further, decisive effort should be made to identify the vulnerabilities in CAV network, determine the risk associated with these networks under cyberattacks and provide mitigation approaches so that future applications
will perform resiliently when they are attacked.

2.1.1

Architecture of CAVs

In CAV environments, a vehicle will share its sensor and vehicle dynamics information with other vehicles in its vicinity through BSMs. This information
sharing will improve traffic flow, road safety, and fuel economy [28]. A simple
illustration of CAV networks is shown in Figure 2.1 and explained as follows:
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(i) V2V Communication: This applies to any vehicle connected to any other
type of vehicle. Communication mode is inherently wireless, and messages contain information regarding parameters such as position, travel
direction, and speed of the moving vehicle to provide localization. V2V
communication technology enables vehicles to transmit and receive omnidirectional messages, usually every 100 milliseconds (ms), and establishes
a 360-degree awareness of other neighboring vehicles.
Vehicles may assess possible crash threats through these messages as
they evolve. V2V technology uses dedicated short-range communication
(DRSC) or C-V2X technologies operated in the 5.9 GHz band [29]. Moreover, vehicles also employ a human–machine interface (HMI) to interact
with the driver to warn other road users regarding occurrences such as
change speed or change direction, thereby preventing collisions.
(ii) V2I Communication: This type deals with communication between vehicles and highway infrastructure, including traffic lights, road sensors,
speed cameras, traffic sensors, satellite communications, and parking meters. V2I communication is bi-directional and wireless.
V2I communication is carried out using DRSC/C-V2X frequencies equivalent to V2V connectivity. Data collected from infrastructure are used to
provide real-time advisory information to the traveler, e.g., adjustment of
direction, brake, and routes or escape from other circumstances.
(iii) V2P Communication: This type deals with the communication of nearby
pedestrians’ safety to vehicles. The goal is to increase pedestrian safety,
prevent collisions affecting road users, and improve vehicle occupants’
safety. Pedestrian detection system is an essential feature of V2P [29], [30],
which can be applied in a variety of ways: (1) implanted within vehicles
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(for blind-spot alert, accident ahead alert, etc.); (2) embedded within roadside facilities, e.g., lane-closing warning; and (3) carried by pedestrians,
e.g., smart sensors, to notify drivers.

F IGURE 2.1: The basic system architecture of connected vehicles
having three types of communications: vehicle to vehicle (V2V),
infrastructure to infrastructure (I2I), and infrastructure to vehicle
(I2V; figure adapted from [31])

Challenges
Owing to the movement of vehicles, CAV tends to be highly dynamic [32]. As
a result of this dynamic topology, communication among CAVs lasts for a short
period, resulting in limited data exchange; in other words, the connectivity is
too transient.
Additionally, the various trajectories of travel of each CAV and attackers’
behaviors can contribute to the dynamic topology of the CAV network. This
complex nature of the topology makes CAVs more vulnerable to attacks [33].
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In general, network and attacker behaviors play a major role in CAV network security. These two behaviors are inter-related because the CAV system
network demonstrates network entities with positive behavior, while the attacker shows negative behavior. The negative behavior of the attacker poses a
threat to the network users. Hence, an attacker’s activity is capable of modifying the structure or topology of the network. This modified network topology
can make it impossible for the detector approach to capture the behaviors of
adversarial vehicles in the CAV setting.
- Network Behavior
In this context, users, vehicles, and RSUs are the CAV network entities, and
each entity has its behavior. Malicious vehicles can modify the topology, which
may misguide other entities in the CAV network. The following are the primary
reasons for the change in network behavior:
(i) Speed of vehicles: The speed and movement of vehicles are different relative to mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), which, if very strong, the
vehicle’s location in a network will be modified in a few seconds. Such
modification makes it difficult for models to capture the dynamics of attacker behaviors.
(ii) Density of the network: This is another significant aspect of the vehicle
environment and deals with the presence of many vehicles on the road.
Each vehicle is relatively dynamic with continuously shifting locations.
This shifting of location in the CAVs network provides a daunting challenge for effective coordination in a high-density network due to no central control. This situation equally creates challenges regarding identification of attacker vehicles.
(iii) Dynamics of network topology: The dynamic network topology and the
narrow range of V2V communication can result in regular network partitioning and disconnection. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate the unstable state
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of the CAVs network. In this context, new vehicles join the network, which
quickly changes the overall network topology.
Figure 2.2 depicts the condition whereby vehicles exchange information
on the highway among themselves, and an attacker, vehicle X launches a
malicious attack on Vehicles A and B in the time frame T1 . Further, Figure
2.3 shows the change in the topology of the network in the time frame T2 .
The vehicle location shift results in attacker Vehicle X, Vehicles A and B
being near to RSU. The variation of vehicle location results in the launch
of an attack in different positions. As depicted in Figure 2.3, the attack is
shifted from vehicles A and B to RSU due to variation in attacker Vehicle
X 0 s old and current positions.

F IGURE 2.2: Network and attacker behavior in the time frame T1
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F IGURE 2.3: Network and attacker behavior in the time frame T2

- Attacker Behavior
In the simulated network, a vehicle can be in two states, namely honest and
attacker. The honest vehicles always provide true information. However, an
attacker can switch between honest and attacker states. How often an attacker
switches, its state is varied to capture the performance of the designed detection
algorithms. This state switching of an attacker makes it difficult to identify it
in the network. The two states are depicted in Figure 2.4 and are explained as
follows:
Zero (honest) state: In this case, the attacker does not initiate an attack in the
network, but rather exhibits honest behavior and communicates its correct
information.

One (attack) state: In this case, the attacker enters into the attacker state and
changes its behavior for a certain amount of time and creates an attack.
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F IGURE 2.4: States of an attacker

2.1.2

Dedicated Short-Range Communication

DSRC is the primary enabler of V2V and V2I wireless communication technologies. Initially, the US FCC allocated a 75 MHz bandwidth at 5.9 GHz spectrum band for DSRC operation. DSRC’s requirements are published as several IEEE standards that deal with wireless access in vehicular environment
(WAVE), which define the PHY and MAC layers (IEEE 802.11p) and the upper
layers (standards of IEEE 1609 family). However, in 2020, FCC limited DSRC’s
bandwith to 10 MHz and mandated seize of all DSRC operations by 2023.
Although DSRC will not be the V2V technology in the US, several automobile producers, information and communication technology (ICT) providers,
academics, and governments are still working closely together to realize this
exciting technology in other countries [34], [35], [36].

2.1.3

Cellular Vehicle to Everything

C-V2X is a vehicle communication technology focused on a cellular network
that meets the requirement of both the initial case of LTE V2X in 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) Release 14 and the advance case of 5G-based V2X
[37]. The 3GPP regulates the C-V2X technology based on the growing needs of

16

V2X providers and the automotive industry [38]. The communication technology facilitates conventional vehicle-to-network (V2N) communication to provide back-end services and enables direct transmission between end devices,
i.e., V2V, V2P, and V2I communication [39]. For standardization, the C-V2X
technology was launched as LTE-V in 3GPP Release 14 and is being progressively evolved in 3GPP. It is now part of 3GPP Release 15 to satisfy the criteria
for vehicular implementations of fifth-generation (5G) cellular networks. The
side-link communication of C-V2X allows devices to work practically in two
modes ( such as in in-coverage and out-of-coverage modes).
C-V2X addresses use cases for traffic quality and safety, where data are communicated with short latency constraints in the vehicle’s vicinity. The safety
and traffic efficiency applications of C-V2X depend on a periodic exchange of
low latency messages [39].

2.1.4

ML Detection Approach

This section highlights some of the main problems associated with CAVs. The
section also offers a detailed description of how ML resolves these challenges,
in particular DL algorithms.
ML algorithms emphasize the ability to deal with changes and challenges
and respond to the environment through adaptive data-driven decisionmaking [40], [41]. ML attribute is quite unlike traditional schemes, which rely
on explicit device parameters and thresholds for decision-making. The ML
algorithms can take advantage of several features of generated data, such as
BSMs ( i.e., vehicle activity patterns, vehicle locations/kinetics, etc.), to learn
the system dynamics and then select correct features to establish a learning
process. The information from BSMs can further be used to improve network
performance and detection accuracy of the effects/impacts of malicious
vehicles. ML can learn the dynamics in the environment and then extract
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appropriate features for activity detection. ML strategies can be classified
into three groups, namely supervised learning, unsupervised learning (UL),
and reinforcement learning (RL). Learning schemes, such as semi-supervised
learning, online learning, and learning transfer, can be seen as variants of these
three major types. An ML algorithm typically requires two stages: training and
testing. In the training state, a system learns from the training data, and in the
testing state, predictions are generated to evaluate the model’s performance.

2.1.5

Different Types of Machine Learning

Supervised Learning: Supervised learning algorithms contain a dataset that
has both features and labels/targets. The algorithms learn by associating their
inputs to the outputs, given a training set of inputs x and outputs y. On many
occasions, it may be challenging to collect the output automatically [42]. The
supervised learning algorithms can observe numerous examples of random
vector x and the associated vector y and learn to predict y from x by estimating
the probability of p (y | x ).
Supervised learning problems can be further divided into classification and
regression.
Unsupervised Learning: Unlike supervised learning algorithm, UL learns
on unlabeled data. This means that the training data only contain input variables, not output variables. These algorithms aim to learn the structure, behavior, or the distribution of the data through modeling and comprehension [43].
Reinforcement Learning: RL problem is designed to be an exact representation of the problem of learning from interaction to accomplish a goal [44]. In
RL, the learner and decision-makers are known as the agent. The agent can be
modeled autonomously to perform optimum sequential actions with or without
minimal prior knowledge of the environment, making it incredibly adaptable
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and useful in real-time and adversarial contexts. The agents’ sequential behavior shows their suitability for CAV security implementations, where threats are
becoming increasingly complex, rapid, and pervasive [45].
The environment is the object that the agent interacts with and corresponds
to everything outside the agent. The agent’s continuous interaction with the environment prompts it to select actions, and the environment responds to those
actions by presenting a new situation to the agent. The environment equally
gives rise to rewards, which are distinct numerical values that the agent attempts to maximize over time.
The agent and its environment interact in every sequence of discrete-time
steps, t = 0, 1, 2, 3, .... In each of the time steps t, the agent gets some representations of the environment’s state, St ∈ S ; where, S is a set of possible states,
which selects actions, At ∈ A (St ). Here, A (St ) is a set of actions available
in state St . A time step later, partly as a consequence of its action, the agent
receives a numerical reward, Rt+1 ∈ R ⊂ R, and then finds itself in a new
state, St+1 . Each step leads the agent to implement a mapping from states to
probabilities of selecting each potential action. The mapping process is known
as agent’s policy and is denoted as pit , where πt ( a | s) is the probability that
At = a if St = s. RL mechanisms specify how the agent changes its policy
from its experience. Overall, the agent’s goal is to maximize the total amount of
reward it has over the long run.

2.2

Related Work

As vehicles get more interconnected with their external environment, a number
of attacks surface and the possibility of leveraging vulnerabilities increases. A
growing body of literature has established CAV vulnerabilities and examined
the possible effects of successful exploitation of vulnerability while proposing
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some mitigating steps [46]. The recent interest on anomaly detection has created a large amount of literature over the past few years. It is challenging in
many disciplines, including automotive engineering [47], environmental engineering, and wireless networks [22]. CAV communication can use ML algorithms to detect fault, diagnose, monitor, and intrusion detection [22]. Also,
CAV communication can use simple reconfiguration control to prevent or reduce potential loss where anomalies can easily be detected. Various detection
mechanisms have been developed in recent years to detect abnormal behaviors
and identify their sources [21].
For example, in the field of CAV, recent studies demonstrate the vulnerability of CAV sensors (such as speed, acceleration, and position sensors) to
cyberattacks or faults. Sensor behavior with an anomaly is a result of either
sensor failure or malicious cyberattack. CAV has many internal and external
cyberattack surfaces from which adversaries can act on and exploit [48]–[50]. In
[21], the authors conceived a novel model with comprehensive architecture that
combines the adaptive extended Kalman filter (AEKF) with a moving vehicle
model to detect faults/malicious activities in CAV network. The authors proposed a model that could detect different types of attacks effectively. However,
the downside of this approach is that it is greatly affected by uncertainty such
as processing noise and, at the same time, is very sensitive to the corruption of
outliers [51]. Moreover, Kalman filter-based strategy is computationally complex [52]. [27] shows that fake message intrusion and map network attacks are
two of the most dangerous attacks/anomalies in CAVs. For example, fake messages may be communicated by the infrastructure, such as RSUs, or a nearby
vehicle. Additionally, malicious vehicles can send fake messages through service advertisements, BSMs, and so on. The fake message communication may
put CAV passengers and other road users in life-threatening conditions. In [53],
the authors developed an anomaly detection approach using entropy-based approaches in in-vehicle networks. The entropy-based approach has been well
20

studied in the literature. However, due to traffic variation in CAV systems, the
entropy detection technique is vulnerable to a high rate of false positives [54].
In [22], a methodology that can seamlessly detect anomalies and their sources
in real-time is developed. The authors created an anomaly detection mechanism by combining DL, particularly convolutional neural network (CNN), with
Kalman filter-X 2 mechanism to detect and identify anomalous sensor readings
in the CAV system. However, the second phase of the model’s analysis may not
perform well when subjected to false data injection attacks derived statistically
due to the independence of statistics characteristics nature of Kalman Filter-X 2
[55]. Again, Kalman filter is computationally complex for such anomaly detection [52]. In [19], VANET positional attacks are created using conventional
attack methods and a dataset called Veremi (Vehicle Comparison Misbehavior)
is developed. The authors developed a detection methodology, namely Maat3,
a detection and fusion framework based on subjective logic. The subjective
logic framework is deployed on a false position attack. Although the subjective logic utilizes probabilistic models with an explicit notion of uncertainty,
reputation and computation here depend on the trust framework structure and
often involve discarding information [56]. Again, this method employs a traditional trust technique that goes with a predefined threshold. This technique
may not perform well in practice in a real-time scenario, such as in CAV networks [11]. Detection of misbehavior in [57] involves deploying a smart protection system to secure self-driving cars’ external communication. The intelligent approach is capable of detecting both gray hole and rushing attacks using
intrusion detection systems-based (IDS-based) support vector machine (SVM)
and feed-forward neural networks (FFNN). However, this technique relies on
selecting kernels and complex computation in the optimization process [58]
and considers only a single-attack scenario. [59] addressed the problem of cyber tracking for a platoon that moves in a cohesive form along a single lane
and is subjected to different kinds of cyber threats. The authors proposed a
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cooperative mechanism that leverages adaptive synchronization mechanisms
to mitigate the effects of malicious vehicles. The combined mechanism in the
form of closed-loop stability is analytically demonstrated using the Lyapunov–
Krasovskii theory. However, the analytical method may not be scalable in realtime scenario [9]. The authors in [16] suggested an intrusion detection approach for user-oriented V2V to protect the network from access denial and
false warning generation using Greenshield’s model. Greenshield’s model uses
a series of identification rules related to each attack to evaluate the correctness
of the information sent by vehicles in a CAV network. A vehicle behavior evaluation technique is used to determine a vehicle’s level of trustworthiness. However, this method may not be scalable in the high dense network with a massive
amount of information [11]. In [7], a novel trust method using logistic regression to identify events and malicious vehicles is proposed. In this context, the
vehicles iteratively learn about the environment from received messages and
then update the value of their neighbors’ trust. A drawback of this model is
the complex iterations, which may likely result in detection latency. This thesis
addresses and discusses the weaknesses of the above-mentioned cited works.
Moreover, it proposes a data-driven anomaly/attack detection mechanism for
CAV systems. The proposed approaches as stated in Section 1.5, are used to
detect and identify abnormal behaviors. Further, single and multiple anomalies are considered to access the reliability and robustness of our approach in a
realistic network setting.
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Chapter 3

Evaluation Methodology for
Misbehavior Formulation and
Detection
The chapter defines the different attack models in CAV and M2M communication and then discusses evaluation strategies and performance metrics used in
the study.

3.1

Methodology

Misbehavior detection in CAV systems offers a significant advantage since message integrity and correctness are more important than confidentiality in such
systems. Misbehavior detection in CAV systems has been tested in vastly different ways with different detection mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms are
analytical, simulated, and often limited experimental cases. These evaluation
mechanisms are also heavily affected by the type of attacks.
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3.1.1

Studied Attacker Models

CAV safety applications rely on data exchanged among neighboring vehicles.
By inserting fake information into CAV networks, attackers can disrupt the
proper functioning of the applications. In particular, attacks can cause applications to signal false warnings or make unnecessary and potentially dangerous
maneuvers in a CAV network, which undermines safety [60].
The concept of attack complies with the attack mechanisms discussed in
Section 2.2. In this study, we consider the attacks that are more of misbehavior rather than a variety of cryptographic attacks. Driven by the experiments
on a real-life message dataset for security applications with CAV, this research
considers the usefulness of BSM features and develops normal and anomalous
behavior models.

3.1.2

CAVs Data Characteristics and Descriptions

The dataset used in this thesis was obtained from the Research Data Exchange
(RDE) database of the Safety Pilot Model Deployment (SPDM) program.
The SPDM program was implemented with the primary aim of testing CAV
in real-life applications and scenarios.

The dataset contains detailed and

high-frequency data (gathered every 100 ms) collected over two years with
participation of more than 2,500 vehicles [22]. The SPDM dataset used in
this analysis includes speed (Sensor 1), denoted as speed; lateral acceleration
(Sensor 2), indicated as Ax; and radius of curvature (Sensor 3), represented as
RoC. Such sensor data are used in the attack formulations as well. A dataset
of thirty three thousand (33,000) samples are used for both attack formulation
and detection process.
As there is no public dataset available for CAVs that includes anomalous
behavior in sensor measurements due to attacks and ground truths, we used
simulation to produce datasets for our experiments. In particular, we accounted
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for three types of anomalous behavior: instant, bias, and gradual drift. We
presumed that in sensors, anomalous values exist independently due to either
attacks or faults.
Our experiment generated various anomalous dataset rates, denoted as α ∈

{3 %, 10 %, 50 %}, in which one type of attack or all the three types are equally
likely to adversely affect each of the three sensors, as discussed in Section 3.1.3.
Explicitly, we sampled a uniform random variable of U (0, c) was used at each
time epoch (every 100 ms) in the CAV trip to decide whether anomaly exists;
if it did, another uniform random variable of U (0, c) was used to determine
the affected sensor. Depending entirely on the experiment, we randomly sampled from one or three anomalous types with uniform or normal distributions.
The generated attacks were added to the base value of the sensor. Algorithm 1
provides the pseudocode depicting the random generation of anomalies.
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3.1.3

Attack/Anomaly Model for CAV System

(i) Instant anomaly (I): This anomaly was simulated as a Gaussian random
variable with 0 and 0.01 representing the mean and variance, respectively,
based on an epoch of 200 ms.

The mean and variance values were

scaled by a constant c, i.e., c ∈ {2000, 4000, 6000, 8000, 10000}, where
c × N (0, 0.01) captures the various magnitudes.

The corresponding

simulation values were added to the sensor’s base value.
(ii) Bias anomaly (B): This anomaly was simulated by adding an offset to
the observation, which was different from the normal sensor reading.
The magnitude of the anomalies was sampled with uniform distribution

U (0, c), where c ∈ {2000, 4000, 6000, 8000, 10000}. In this part of the
experiment, we accounted for the different values of anomalous behavior
duration d in the system. The values represent the number of periods the
anomalous behavior exists in the system, where d ∈ {3, 5, 7}
(iii) Gradual drift (G): This anomaly was simulated by linearly adding values
in decreasing/increasing order to the base sensor values. The linear vector of values was increased from 0 to c ∈ {2000, 4000, 6000, 8000, 10000}
for each experiment. This sequence-generating function was denoted by
linspace (0, c). Again, we accounted for the various values of duration
d ∈ {3, 4, 7} of the anomalous behaviors.
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Algorithm 1: Connected and Automated Vehicle (CAV) Cyberattack
Generation Process
1 α: rate of anomaly
2 m: number of sensors
3 D: highest anomaly duration
4 t: time epoch
5 for t ∈ T do
6
7
8

for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} do
if no trace of anomaly occurs at time t for the ith sensor then
if U (0, c) ≤ α then
d← randi(D)

9

switch (Choose anomaly type with probability distribution f ω )

10
11

case Instant:
Inject ’instant’ anomaly type with parameter c1

12
13

case Bias:
Inject ’bias’ anomaly type with parameter c2 and d

14
15

case Gradual Drift:
Inject ’Gradual drift’ anomaly type with parameter c3 and d

16
17
18
19
20

end switch
end if
end if
end for

21 end for
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3.1.4

Misbehavior Scenarios and Alert Types

This section explains different emergency alerts in a CAV network. The attack
formulations stated in Section 3.1.3 can alter the safety-related BSM features,
which eventually can result in false emergency alerts in the CAV network.
Emergency Electronic Brake Light (EEBL)
Anomaly in vehicular speed and lateral acceleration (Ax) can result in false
EEBL notification. An anomalous CAV vehicle Vi with manipulated speed vi 0 ,
as shown in Section 3.1.3, can introduce a false reference position. This attack
can cause damage such as rear-end collision. In Figure 3.1, an attacker CAV,
denoted as Vi , raises an alert and sends its false location ( xi 0 , yi 0 ), marked with a
red dotted square with velocity vi 0 , across the network to prevent anyone from
detecting its false warning.
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v
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/

v
i

False location report
F IGURE 3.1: False emergency electric brake light (EEBL) alert
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Change of Lane (CoL)
CoL alert in CAV networks increases vehicle safety in a dense driving area.
CoL devoid of attacks can prevent fatal accidents that can occur when a vehicle
unexpectedly switches its current path on a roadway. Figure 3.2 illustrates attacks caused by false CoL alerts. At time t with velocity vi 0 , attacker Vi sends a
false CoL alert to other CAVs for lane switching with current a false location denoted as ( xi 0 , yi 0 ), marked with a red dotted square, instead of its actual position

( xi , yi ), as shown in Figure 3.2.
The short distance between Vi and Vk prohibits Vi from changing lanes.
However, the false reported location makes the inter-vehicle gap between Vi
and Vk appear too wide for Vi to change the lane immediately; here, ( xi , yi ) <

( xi 0 , yi 0 ) < x j , x j .

v

/

i

Ui

v
i

vk

vj
False location report
F IGURE 3.2: Change of lane (CoL) attack scenario

Path Deviation Alert (PDA)
For a straight road, it is estimated that the lateral acceleration should be 0, since
the RoC is 0. Conversely, if the road has a non-negative RoC, there is the possibility of this resulting to accident.The lateral acceleration A x is related to RoC
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by
A x = RoC × r2

(3.1)

As shown in Figure 3.3, the attacker vehicle Vi at position ( xi , yi ) can communicate to vehicle Vj with a RoC value of 0. Vj receives a falsified message, adjusts
its speed, and keeps heading in a straight line assuming that Vi is at position

( xi 0 , yi 0 ). Vj will undoubtedly deviate from the lane if it goes by the information
given by attacker vehicle Vi . The vehicle Vj needs to consider the tangential
speed needed to turn the curved road. False alerts like this will invariably lead
to vehicle crashes.

F IGURE 3.3: Path deviation attacker (PDA) Scenario

3.1.5

Attacker Model for Machine-to-Machine (M2M) Communication

The synthetic data attack formulation in this context assumed a network of connected vehicles. In the simulation, vehicles were configured to transmit their
opinions (BSM features) in a scheduled broadcast. The vehicles were assigned
the speed of 24–29 m/s, once every 10 secs. Our proposed model assumes that
these vehicles share opinions among themselves in the network and the cloud.
When vehicles keep encountering their neighbors, they can form opinions about
themselves.
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In the attack formulation, we configured malicious and honest code words
that convey malicious and honest messages, where n is the maximum number of messages. The percentage of malicious code word at a given instance is
quantified as q, while the honest percentage is represented by 100 − q.
The q value ranges from 10 % to 50 % with different probabilities denoted as
p. A malicious code word was formulated by increasing the variance of some
fraction of the vehicle’s opinion. The simulation results presented a maximum
of 50 % of the vehicles to be malicious.

3.1.6

Evaluation Strategy

ML-based evaluation approaches allow for a large-scale analysis and evaluation of detector performance. However, only few pieces of research have been
done on empirical analysis of CAV attacks. This is because these empirical
analyses are challenging to generalize and validate without the extensive implementation of vehicular communication systems. The critical question is that
what variables might influence the overall detection efficiency, and such variable should be evaluated individually to make general assumptions about a
detection system’s suitability.
Variables such as the number of attackers, density of the vehicular network,
and the attacks’ duration were evaluated in the simulation. By examining these
key variables, insights can be obtained on detector performance in different situations and how it responds when a severely attacked message is observed.
Comparatively, the potential to detect attacks in the study of the detection
systems is the main focus of this thesis. For optimal results, we expect our
method to classify all messages from the attacker as malicious. The robust attack
detection approach will give a rough estimate of detector performance, which
is important if the attack’s aim is uncertain.
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3.1.7

Misbehavior Detection Metrics

In this subsection, the different metrics that are generally used in the model
evaluation are discussed. Performance metrics often differ across publications
based on the detector’s intent. Perhaps for attack detection in CAV, determining
detection mechanisms and selecting the correct one for deployment is tough but
important [22]. The following performance metrics are considered in this thesis
work:
(i) Confusion matrix: The confusion matrix is the simplest method for determining a detector’s quality of results. In general, this matrix counts false
positive f p, false negative f n, true positive tp, and true negative tn, as
well as their rates for the whole population. These matrices are defined as
follows:
• tp: Malicious information correctly labeled as malicious.
• f p: Honest information incorrectly labeled as malicious.
• tn: Honest information correctly labeled as honest
• f n: Malicious information incorrectly labeled as honest.
Metrics derived from this include accuracy, F1 − score, receiver operating characteristic denoted as (RO), recall, and precision. These derived
metrics depend on the type of decisions that a detector can make. In subsequent sections, descriptions of these output metrics are obtained.
(ii) Accuracy (AR): This is the simplest measurement approach used to decide how accurate the classifier is. The accuracy measurement approach
can be seen as an intuitive choice for large-scale evaluation. The measurement approach is determined by the number of correct classifications

(tp + tn). Overall, classifications (tp + f p + tn + f n) appear intuitive but
suffer from imbalanced sets. Therefore, it is a common practice [18] to
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have a two-value quantification, demonstrating the trade-off between increased false positives to minimize false negatives and increased f n to
minimize f p ones; AR is represented in 3.2 and 3.3, respectively:

Accuracy = 100 % ×

Total number o f correctly classi f ied process
Total number o f process
(3.2)
tp + tn
.
(3.3)
AR =
tp + tn + f p + f n

(iii) Precision and recall (sensitivity): Precision quantifies the importance of
the detection events, while recall quantifies which positive rating is observed. For an optimal detection performance, precision and recall must
have a value of 1. The degree to which a deviation from these performance
values is appropriate depends on the application [18]. The equations for
performance and recall are shown in 3.4 and 3.5, respectively:

Precision =

Recall =

tp
tp + f p

tp
tp + f n

(3.4)

(3.5)

(iv) True positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR):
TPR, also known as sensitivity or recall, is the ratio of the number of
positive data points that are correctly predicted as positives. TPR [61]:

TPR =

tp
tp + f n

(3.6)

Conversely, FPR is the proportion of the negative message points mistakenly predicted to be positive to actual negative data points [61]. FPR can
be mathematically represented as follows:
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FPR =

fp
.
f p + tn

(3.7)

(v) F1 − Score : Precision and recall are sometimes combined in weighted
mean, know as the F1 − score:


F1 − score = 1 + β2 .

precision.recall

( β2 .precision) + recall

.

(3.8)

The F1 − score attains the highest performance level at a value of 1, and
this level implies perfect precision and recall. Simultaneously, the worstcase scenario occurs when the precision and recall have values of 0.
(vi) Area under curve (AUC): The RO curve is a coordinate map comprised
of a horizontal axis of FPR and a vertical axis of TPR [62]. RO curve is
a comprehensive metric that represents the sensitivity and specificity of
a continuous variable. The area under the RO curve is defined as AUC.
The AUC sums up the information in the RO curve with a single number.
For an ideal anomaly detector, the TRP will be 1 and the FPR will be 0,
resulting in a step-shaped curve with an AUC of 1.
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Chapter 4

Misbehavior Detection in CAV
Network Based on Machine
Learning
This chapter discusses different approaches used in this work to accomplish
anomaly detection.

4.1

M2M Attack Detection Approach

This section discusses the approaches used to detect and identify abnormal behaviors associated with cyberattacks in the M2M network. The approaches are
XGBoost, random forest (RandF), and XGBoost optimized with BPSO (BPSOXGBoost; the proposed method).
Binary Particle Swarm Optimization (BPSO)
The particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm takes its inspiration from the
foraging behavior of birds. One intriguing characteristic of PSO is lack of strong
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assumption on the criterion, such as continuity or differentiability to find optimal solutions; thus, it can be easily applied to solve optimization problems
through simulation of social behaviors [63]. Compared to other optimization
methods, the PSO mechanism is robust, scalable, easy to implement, and swift
in finding approximate optimal solutions. However, PSO mechanisms are often
hard to scale to large problems [64].
For the PSO, the optimization problem’s candidate solution is a particle in
the hyperparameter space. Each particle has a fitness value, velocity, and position that corresponds to it. The direction and displacement of the particle to
search for the candidate solution are determined by the particle’s velocity. A fitness value is given to a particle according to its position to describe how good a
position is. Thus, finding the best position that has a fitness value becomes the
optimization problem. The PSO method finds the optimal solution by looping
through a group of initialized random particles.
The number of particles are in the D-dimensional space is denoted as m,
and the velocity and position of the ith particle at ith iteration are represented
as Vi (t) = (vi1 (t) , vi2 (t) , ..., viD (t)) and Xi (t) = ( xi1 (t) , xi2 (t) , ..., xiD (t)), respectively, where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}. The particle adjusts its position and velocity
according to its current position and velocity, respectively. The best-known position identified by the particle is represented by the particle itself and the entire
particle swarm as pbest and Gbest , respectively. Each particle will update its velocity and position before the next iteration as given in 4.1:

Vi (t) = wVi (t − 1) + c1 r1



Pibest



− Xi (t − 1) + c2 r2 ( Gbest − Xi (t − 1)) (4.1)

Xi (t) = Xi (t − 1) + Vi (t) ,

(4.2)

Here, c1 and c2 represent the particle and population acceleration factors,
respectively; r1 and r2 represent two independent positive random numbers
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between 0 and 1; and w, as shown in 4.1, denotes the inertia weight. The linearly
decreasing strategy of w is represented in 4.3.

ω=

ωmax + (iter − iteri ) × (ωmax − ωmin )
,
iter

(4.3)

where iter denotes the maximum number of iterations, iteri represents the current number of iterations, and wmax and wmin are the maximum and minimum
values of w, respectively. The original PSO is continuous PSO (CPSO), which
is implemented and extended to solve several continuous problems [65]. However, PSO has been developed to deal with discrete problems and this PSO is
known as BPSO. In BPSO, the position is a binary vector, while the velocity still
maintains the continuous vector form. The velocity of BPSO can still be updated with 4.1. However, the velocity entry, unlike in PSO, is used to evaluate
the probability that the respective position entry takes a value of 1, as shown in
the position update in 4.1.

The transfer function denoted by T Vij helps in converting velocities to
probabilities; it is expressed as follows:


T Vij =

1
1 + eVij

(4.3)

This transfer function equally helps in updating each bit position as follows:




 1
if
∪ (0, 1) < T Vij
Xij =

 0 otherwise

(4.4)

The BPSO approach is applied in Section 4.1.1 for optimization process.
Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost)
The XGBoost is a powerful ML algorithm that uses decision tree algorithms
as its primary unit. Comparison of XGBoost to the traditional gradient boost
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decision tree (GBDT) algorithms, which optimize using the first-order derivative information, shows that the XGBoost has made a significant improvement
in optimization. The XGboost performs the second-order Taylor expansion to
compute its loss function while reserving and adding the information of the
first- and the second-order derivatives, respectively. The retention of information of the first- and the second-order derivatives can make XGBoost approach
converge more quickly.
The practical derivative of XGBoost algorithm can be determined as follows:
Let the abnormal dataset D = {( xi , yi ) : i = 1...n, xi ∈ Rm , yi ∈ R}, where xi is
the training set, yi is the class label, and n and m are the sample data and features, respectively. By setting the maximum iteration time to K, the integrated
approach tree predicts the final result as follows:
K

ŷ =

∑

f k ( xi ) , f K ∈ F

(4.5)

k =1

Here, f K (.) represents a weak learner, and F is a set of regression trees.
XGBoost’s tree boost algorithm uses Newton boosting rather than gradient
boosting to find the best parameters [66] to minimize regularized objective function. The equation for Newton boosting is shown below:
m

L (φ) = ∑ l (ŷ, yi ) + ∑ Ω ( f k )
i

(4.6)

k

Here, Ω ( f K ) = γT + 21 λ kwk2 (it represents the complexity of the k th tree
approach); m means the sample size; T is the number of leaves in a tree; w symbolizes the weight of the leaf nodes; γ controls the rate of complexity penalty
on T, and λ controls the rate of regularization of f K .
However, the tree ensemble method finds it difficult to minimize loss function in 4.6 with the conventional methods in Euclidean space; thus, the method
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is trained using an additive approach as explained in [67]. This approach includes weaker learner f k , at i − th iteration denoted as f t , which improves the
approach and yields a new loss function as defined in 4.7.

Lt =

n



t −1
l
y
,
ŷ
+
f
x
+ Ω ( ft )
(
)
t
i
∑ i i

(4.7)

i =1

Here, l denotes a training loss function, which measures the difference between
(t)

the prediction ŷi , and the object yi , ŷi

represents the prediction of the i − th

instance at the t − th iteration. Furthermore, the second-order Taylor expansion
is performed on 4.7 to quickly and conveniently minimize the loss function.
This process of Taylor expansion is given by

L

(t)

n


 

1 2
( t −1)
' ∑ l yi , ŷ
+ gi f t ( x i ) + h i f t ( x i ) + Ω ( f t ) ,
2
i =1

(4.8)

where gi , f i are the first and second derivative, respectively. Now, the g and h
derivatives can be described as follows:


g (i ) = ∂ŷ(t−1) l yi , ŷ(t−1)

(4.9)



hi = ∂2ŷ(t−1) l yi ŷ(t−1)

(4.10)

The optimal estimate of the weight of each of the leaves in the decision tree (DT)
can be formulated as follows:
w∗j =

∑ i ∈ I j gi

(4.11)

∑i ∈ Ij + λ

From 4.11, the corresponding optimal value for a given node’s loss function can
be computed as:

L(t) = −

1
2

T



∑ i ∈ I j gi

∑∑

j =1

i ∈ Ij
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2

hi + λ

+ γT

(4.12)

The details of anomaly detection with XGBoost are presented in Section
4.1.1.
Random Forest
The RandF classifier is an ensemble method that uses bootstrapping, aggregation, and bagging to train multiple DTs in parallel [68]. Bootstrapping ensures
that multiple individual trees are trained in parallel on different subsets of the
training dataset using various subsets of available features. RandF classifier aggregates individual DT for the final decision; as a result, RandF classifier has
strong generalization [69]. Moreover, bootstrapping maintains the uniqueness
of each of the individual DT in the RandF, which helps reduce the variance of
the RandF classifier.
The anomaly detection process of RandF can be determined as follows:
Let D be the anomaly dataset, | D | ∈ N be the number of samples that make
up D, and xi ∈ X (0 ≤ i ≤ | D |) be a sample within the abnormal dataset. Let
Y be the set of class labels for dataset D, yi ∈ Y be the label associated with xi ,

C be the RandF classifier, |C| ∈ N be the number of estimators that compose C ,
and tr j ∈ C (0 ≤ j ≤ |C |) be a tree of classifier C , which classifies the honest and
malicious BSMs.
After training C by D training dataset and Y class labels, the set of probability labels ŷ is obtained from D through C , as defined in 4.13 below:
|C|

ŷ =

∑ j=1 trij

|C|

(4.13)

Here, trij represents the output of the tree tr j for sample xi . The details of the performance results of RandF on M2M malicious activity detection are presented
in Section 5.1. Possible estimation is done on the output class C(0,1) , which comprises of the malicious and honest information in this case. The output label is
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given as C0,1 , where 0 and 1 denote malicious and honest information, respectively. The probability of estimation of the output label is expressed as follows:




P C(0,1) | X = N1 ∑iN=1 Pi C(0,1) | X . An adaptive threshold is automated by
the approach while determining the best estimation that can accurately classify
both the malicious and honest information.

4.1.1

The Proposed Approach

In this study, the goal is to optimize the parameters of the XGBoost method
with BPSO for optimal results in M2M anomaly detection. Although the XGBoost method provides excellent results, the algorithm’s training takes longer
due to trees built-in sequences. Moreover, the method is hard to tune owing to
the enormous amount of parameters [70]. In XGBoost operation, the parameters needed for the anomaly detection are set empirically at maximum iteration
K; thus, hyperparameter optimization for XGBoost becomes essential at this
point [71]. The BPSO maintains excellent results in optimization problems by
creating an optimal solution for hyperparameter search.
The task considers six important parameters for tree booster in XGBoost
method for optimization: learning rate (eta), max_child, max_depth, gamma

(γ), subsample, and colsample_bytree. Table 4.1 gives detailed descriptions of
the parameters. The BPSO sets to optimize the six parameters of XGBoost that
are shown in Table 4.1, and each BPSO’s particle represents a six-dimensional
vector. Each dimension represents the optimal solution for a single XGBoost
parameter. In this task, we further demonstrate the steps for BPSO-XGBoost
approach pipeline as follows:
(i) The dimensions based on the number of parameters to be optimized are
identified and particle positions and velocities are randomly initialized.
Each particle’s position attribute in our task, as shown in 4.18, is a sixdimensional vector with a range that covers the entire search space. Since
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TABLE 4.1: XGBoost optimized parameters

Parameter
eta

Default value
0.3

Range
[0, 1]

max_depth

6

[0, ∞ ]

mini_child_weight

1

[0, ∞ ]

gamma (γ)

0

[0, ∞ ]

subsample

1

(0, ∞ ]

colsample_bytree

1

(0, ∞ ]

Explanation
Learning rate used for update to
avoid overfitting.
A tree’s maximum depth. By increasing the maximum depth, the approach becomes more complex and
more likely to over-fit.
Minimum leaf weight. This is the
minimum instance weight for a child
Minimum loss reduction needed for
further partition on a leaf node of a
tree.
This is the subsample ratio of training
instances.
This is the subsample ratio of
columns while constructing each tree.

the components of each dimension conform to different XGBoost parameters, the initialized range of each dimension remains different. The i − th
particle’s position vector with their respective parameters at a time t is
defined as
max_depth

Pi(t) = [ pieta
(t) , pi (t)

min_child_weight

, pi (t)

subsample

pi (t)

gamma

, pi (t)

,

colsample_bytree

, pi (t)

]

(4.18)

Since every particle travels in the same search space, its velocity is initialized to range of (0, 1) in each dimension when t = 0. The velocity of the
i − th particle at time t is shown in 4.19.
max_depth

Vi(t) = [vieta
(t) , vi (t)

min_child_weight

, vi (t)

subsample

vi (t)

gamma

, vi (t)

,

colsample_bytree

, vi (t)

]

(4.19)

Based on the present task, XGBoost is used to detect anomaly problem by

42

way of classification, the performance of the final training scores as the
the fitness function for BPSO is taken. The fitness of the i − th particle at a
given time t can be expressed as follows:



Fi (t) = Pi(t) → XGBoost |training set

metric=training score

(4.14)

The local optimal value of the global m-individual particle in time t is
taken as
Pibest
(t)





= max Fi( j) , 0 ≤ j ≤ t

(4.15)

Further, the global optimal value for the global m individual particle at
time t is represented as


Gbest(t) = max Pkbest
(t) , 1 ≤ k ≤ m

(4.16)

1. The position, velocity, and inertia weight obtained from 4.15 and 4.16 for
each particle are updated in line with 4.1 and 4.2. Then, a new position
is assigned to BPSO-XGBoost method and a new fitness value is calculated in the form of training scores. Comparison of the historical fitness
is checked to determine the individual optimal values of the particles to
be updated, and it is judged whether global optimal values should be
updated. The process iterates until the maximum number of iterations
or convergence is reached. The optimal fitness value in the form of the
training score (accuracy, TPR, FPR) and resulting optimal position are
then generated. At this stage, BPSO–XGBoost utilizes the optimal parameters to achieve better performance in the detection of anomalies in the
M2M communication network. The details of the results of the proposed
method are provided in Section 5.1.
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4.1.2

CAV Attack Detection Mechanism

This section discusses the approaches used to detect and identify abnormal
behaviors associated with cyberattacks in the CAV network. The approaches
are BDL, one dimensional convolutional neural networks (CNN-1D), support
vector machine (SVM), ensemble multilayer perceptron (EMLP),convolutional
neural network with attention based long memory (CNN-ALSTM) and Kalman
filter convolutional neural network (KF-CNN). The proposed mechanism comprises DWT-BDL and DWT-DDQN.
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
The receptive field (RF) study provides the theoretical basis of CNN’s local perception. CNN consists of layer data, hidden layer, and output layer. The hidden
layer includes the convolution, pooling, activation, and fully connected layers.
At the core of CNN, the convolution layer is prompted by the RF and computes
the data’s convolution from the input layer with filters or kernels to extract
high-level spatial characteristics. The primary function of the pooling layer is
to downsample the number of features. Convolution operations can improve
the original features of the data and reduce the noise.
In this thesis, the convolution of the input sequence x at a time t is represented as
W

yk = f

∑



wi

O



x t − k + 1 + bt

!
(4.17)

i =1

Here, yk is the output feature at time t, f ( x ) is a nonlinear activation function,
wi (i = 1, 2, ..., m) is the filter or kernel of length W, and bt is a given offset vector
at time t.
The striking effect of extracting spatial features makes CNN applicable to be
used with time-series. Usually, CNN has a two-dimensional kernel for extracting features from an input image. However, CNN’s filter can be modified for
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time-series data processing. The idea is to allow the filter to pass only in one
direction to produce a one-dimensional (1D) output suitable for 1D data input.
The mechanism of CNN-1D approach is applied in real-time detection and
identification of abnormal behaviors in a CAV system. A fixed-width sliding
window of CNN is inserted on the input data from the sensors’ measurements.
New observations are gathered from the sensors at each epoch and the sliding
window shifts that include the latest observations. Thus, the CNN’s input during a CAV trip is a continuous feed of raw sensor data. CNN allows for a holistic
view of multiple sensors simultaneously by combining information from other
sensors over time. This combination of information helps detect and identify
abnormal values. Since the goal is to detect anomalous behavior, each sensor
is trained using the labeled sensor readings. If there is an anomalous behavior
relating to a given sensor, the response variable is 0 or 1.
Different approaches are trained to detect anomalous behavior from each
sensor. A logical OR operator on the approach’s outcomes decides whether or
not an anomalous behavior has been observed. The CNN parameter values for
the architecture in Figure 4.1 are selected based on the series of experiments
performed on a validation set to optimize anomaly detection efficiency. This architecture involves three max-pooling and convolution layers. The parameters
are a result of several simulations and variations of hyperparameters. For sound
performance, the output CNN approach is trained with a random dropout rate
of 0.1, and a batch size of 128 is employed. Additionally, batch normalization
and rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation functions are used in layers, as shown
in 4.1, and Adam optimizer for TensorFlow is implemented in Python for the binary cross-entropy minimization. The following parameters are implemented
for the Adam optimization: learning rate, α = 0.001; fuzz factor, e = 10−8 ;
and β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.99. Furthermore, early stopping is introduced to track
validation set accuracy with a duration of 200 epochs to reduce the chance of
over-fitting.
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BSM Input

Dropout (0.1)

CONV 1D
(kernel size : 1x32)

Max Pooling 1D
(pooling size 1x2)

Batch Normalization

CONV 1D
(kernel size : 1x128)

Activate (ReLU)
Batch Normalization
Dropout (0.1)
Activate (ReLU)
Max Pooling 1D
(pooling size 1x2)

Dropout (0.1)

CONV 1D
(kernel size : 1x64)

Max Pooling 1D
(pooling size 1x2)

CONV 1D
(kernel size : 1x64)

Dense Layer

Batch Normalization

Activate(Sigmoid)

Activate (ReLU)
F IGURE 4.1:

Output

One-dimensional convolutional neural network
(CNN-1D) architecture

The results of this method are presented in Section 5.2.
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Classification Criterion of Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) Algorithm
Consider a time series X = x1 , x2 , ..., x m

T

= ( x1 , x2 , ..., xt ) ∈ Rm×t , given that

t is the time stamp of each value and m remains the number of features. Here,

xt = xt1 , xt2 , ..., xtm ∈ Rm is denoted as an input vector at time t. The time series anomaly detection of the input vector is characterized by two problems: 1)
figuring out all the anomaly points and 2) labeling all the target series. CNN approach transforms the anomaly detection mechanism into a classification problem using a sliding window. The sliding window mechanism fragments the
entire multi-variable series into continuously shorter sequences and gets the
two-dimensional dataset:
D = (d1 , d1 , ...dt−T +1 ) = (( x1 , ..., x T ) ; ( x1 , ..., x T ) , ..., x1 , ..., x T ) ∈ RT ×(t−T +1)
(4.18)
Here, T is the sliding window length and di is known as the anomaly series if it
has some anomaly value from the series of origin.
Hence, the problem of detecting anomalies for time series x is transformed to label each input vector for D.

Training dataset with labels is

used to train the CNN approach, and classification approach is applied
on the labeled input vector to detect anomalies. The target can be shown


as max Prob yk = 0 | d j , Prob yk = 1 | d j , where yk = 1 denotes honest
message and yk = 0 denotes abnormal message.

4.1.3

Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT)

DWT transform decomposes the time series data in both the time and frequency
domain, even though it is non-stationary. DWT transform has achieved numerous successful applications in engineering fields, such as signal processing and
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image processing. The basic idea of a DWT denoising approach is shown below:

s (n) = f (n) + ε (t)

(4.19)

Here, s (n) is the observed signal (noisy signal), f (n) is the real signal, and ε (t)
represents the Gaussian white noise. The essence of denoising by the DWT is to
filter out the ε (t) as much as possible.
The theoretical basis of the wavelet threshold denoising method based on
Mallat’s theory assumes that the low-frequency approximation part and highfrequency information portion of a signal can be fully reconstructed [72]. Suppose an original sensor reading denoted by s(n) is given by
j

s (n) =

∑ c j,k ϕ j,k (n) + ∑

k∈z

∑ di,k Ψi,k (n) ,

(4.20)

i =1 k = z

where z is an integer, c j,k is the approximate coefficient, ϕ j,k is the scaling function, while j is the decomposition level, Ψi,k (n) is the wavelet basis function,
and di,k is the detailed coefficient. Here, c j,k contains information on the low
frequency of the original discrete signal s(n), which is stated as follows:

c j,k = s (n) , ϕ j,k (n)

(4.21)

Here, s (n) , ϕ j,k (n) denotes the orthogonal relationship between s (n) and
ϕ j,k (n). The notation di,k has the original discrete signal’s high-frequency information, which is defined as follows:
di,k = s (n) , Ψ j,k (n)

(4.22)

Here, s (n) and Ψ j,k are orthogonal to each other.
The wavelet threshold denoising approach uses its main profile to be the
signal’s low-frequency part, while the high-frequency part represents its details.
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The details of each level have their noise information after the decomposition of
the wavelet. The wavelet threshold function tunes the description coefficients
of each level di,k and is computed with the approximate coefficients of the last
level. The denoising wavelet threshold process is shown in Figure 4.2.
Wavelet
decomposition

Wavelet
thresholding denoising

Wavelet
reconstruction

F IGURE 4.2: Wavelet threshold denoising mechanism

In Figure 4.2, s (n) is the original nosy signal, while m j,k is the wavelet coefficient obtained as a result of wavelet decomposition of the s (n). Here, m j,k
is obtained from the combination of the approximate coefficient c j,k and the detailed coefficient di,k . Further, v j,k remains the estimated wavelet coefficient after
the denoising threshold, and fˆ (n) is the estimated s (n) derived from the reconstruction of v j,k . The DWT is applied to improve performances in Sections 4.1.4
and 4.1.7.
Bayesian Deep Learning (BDL)
BDL framework is required to overcome the challenges in NNs. BDL combines
NN’s transformation from point to probabilistic estimation by establishing a
series of functional transformations in different correlated layers. The NN’s
transformation is mathematically represented as follows:
H

yk ( x, w) = h

∑ wkj

(2)

j =1

D

g

∑ w ji

i =1

(1)

!
xi + w1j0

!
(2)

+ wk0

(4.23)

Here, yk is the kth output of the NN; x is the vector of the variable D for the
(1)

input layer; w is the combination of the adaptive weight parameters w ji and
(2)

(1)

(2)

wkj and the biases w j0 and wk0 ; and H is the number of units in the hidden
layer. From the traditional approach, the variable θ from the training samples is
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estimated by possible minimization of the error function [73], [74].

E = ED + EW =

1 N No
α W
n
n 2
y
x
;
w
−
c
+
(
)
{
}
∑ k
∑ wi2
k
2 n∑
2
=1 k =1
i =1

Here, yk denotes the kth NN output for x n , of the nth training input data; cnk is
the nth target of the output training data; N is the corresponding input and output pairs in the target dataset; No is denoted as the number of output variables;
W is the number of parameters in w; and α is the regularization parameter. The
variables ED and Eθ represent the error between the data and the approximation for NN and decay regularization. The NN approach learning process in the
Bayesian network is interpreted as a probability. The NN approach within the
Bayesian network learning process is to be interpreted in a probabilistic form.
The Bayesian phase achieves NN’s probabilistic nature by adding strong distribution and uncertainty to the network’s weight. The uncertainty in the network
model’s weight enhances the practical framework in the automatic calculation
of error associated with the predictions when dealing with unknown targets.
This probabilistic form of the weight also leverages the system to learn from a
small amount of evidence [75] when information sparsity is experienced in a
given network. Suitable network architecture is then selected, and the model
probability is defined as

p (w | D , α, β, M) =

p (D | w, β, M) p (α, β | M )
p (D | M)

(4.24)

Here, w is the adaptive weight parameter; D is the data; M denotes the Bayesian
model class that specifies the form of the likelihood function and the prior probability distribution; and α, β are the regularization parameters. At this stage,
network training starts with optimizing the input and output data by maximizing the model-specific posterior likelihood by w. At the end of the preparation,
the degree of understanding and generalization is considered adequate. Bayes’

50

Theorem can be extended as seen below to select the appropriate values for the
hyperparameters:

p (α, β | D , M) =

p (D | α, β, M) p (α, β | M)
p (D | M)

(4.25)

The hyperparameters α and β are assumed to be known. Initial values for α and
β are chosen as seen in Figure 4.3, and the associated values of w are obtained by
maximizing their posterior likelihood. Using the following relationship, the hyperparameters are re-estimated, where their MAP values are based on uniform
prior values for α and β, and the estimate of these values maximize evidence
p ( D | α, β, M ) in 4.25. The estimated values of α and β are represented as
γ
2ED

(4.26)

N−γ
2ED

(4.27)

α0 =

β0 =

The γ parameter calculates the approximate number of parameters whose values, rather than the prior values, are controlled by the data, i.e., the number of
well-determined parameters.
The Bayesian approach achieves the correct solution by allowing objective
comparison among different models. The most probable model class within a
set of classes M of Nm (no of candidates) is obtained in Bayesian sample selection by applying the Bayes theorem as follows:




p Mj | D, M ∝ p D | Mj p Mj | M

(4.28)


The factor p M j | D , M is known as the evidence provided by data D for the
model class M j . The user’s judgment on the initial plausibility of each NN

approach is expressed by the prior probability p M j | D , M over the set of
model classes M j for j=1, ... ,Nm , where
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Nm

∑p


Mj | M = 1

(4.29)

j =1

The last problem to be discussed when deciding the optimum architecture
is the relative value of each input variable is the automatic relevance determination (ARD). Using real-system data, distinguishing the important variables
from the redundant ones may be difficult. However, in the Bayesian approach,
the ARD method proposed in [76] can address this problem.
In the method, the input variable is associated with a separate hyperparameter α, representing the inverse variance of that input parameter’s prior distribution. In this way, each hyperparameter reflects the importance of input: A small
value implies that a considerable weight parameter value is permitted and the
resulting input is important; on the contrary, a significant weight parameter
value α is allowed, and the associated weight parameter confines to zero, and
thus the corresponding input is less relevant [76], [77].
The ARD minimizes evidence for the class of model by identifying the hyperparameters in BDL architecture.High hyperparameter values are removed
from the approach at this minimisation stage, and an equilibrium design is reestimated for a new implementation.
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F IGURE 4.3: Bayesian hierarchical framework for neural network
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4.1.4

Discrete Wavelet-Based Deep Reinforcement Learning
with Double Q Learning (DWT-DDQN)

(i) Dataset preparation
In this case, the anomaly problem is formulated as an RL problem. RL
is an autonomous agent that interacts with the environment, takes action,
receives a reward from the environment, and learns to predict anomalies
with high accuracy. The formulation is achieved by replacing the environment with the mini-batch sampling process of the recorded training
BSM anomaly dataset. The sampling process generates sets of training iterations that construct pseudo-environments for anomaly detection. The
BSM dataset includes N samples of BSM features and related labels with
several possible binary values. The mini-batch samples are further assimilated into a DRL concept by considering the features as state s and the
labels values as action a. We trained with mini-batches of BSM samples
consisting of (1) a state, (2) the right label, and (3) a corresponding state. A
mini-batch is a randomly chosen subset of samples from the BSM dataset.
Each training pass uses a separate mini-batch, updated using random
BSM dataset sampling from the simulation. The mini-batch configuration used for the proposed approach detection analysis is presented in
Figure 4.5. In this case, a mini-batch is made up of (n + 1) random dataset
samples. The process of generating each mini-batch takes a random permutation of the dataset before the process is initiated. Then, n+1 random
dataset samples are selected, and the consecutive samples start from a
random index (t).
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Mini-Batch-Set
BSMs Training-Set

BSMs
Sample

------------------------

BSMs features

------------------------

Ground-truth
labels

F IGURE 4.4: Basic safety message (BSM) dataset preparation for
the training of the double deep Q-network (DDQN) approaches
Source: Adapted from [78]

We have St+1 and a∗t+1 as the next state and the action, respectively.
(ii) DDQN approach description
Consider a target Q-value [79] represented as


Q∗ (s, a) = ESt+1 ∼ε r + γmax at+1 Q∗ (St+1 , at+1 ) | s, a , where r is the reward, γ represents the discount factor, and a is the action. Taking the maximum estimated value, max at+1 Q∗ (St+1 , at+1 ), is equivalent to implicitly
taking the maximum overestimate value. The systematic overestimation
can result in maximizing the bias in learning [79]. This type of Q-learning
goes with the bootstrapping learning estimate from an estimate, which
can be problematic.
To deal with this concern of overestimation, DDQN for model structure is
selected. The structure involves using two different Q-value estimators,
each of which updates the other. Independent estimator helps to unbias
Q-value estimates of the action chosen using the oppose estimator [79].
Thus, maximizing bias is avoided by disentangling our updates from bias
estimates.
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(iii) DWT-DDQN anomaly detection strategies
A Q-function provides the highest expected reward based on a specific
state and action. The extent of reward depends on the state and action
pair, Q (s | a). The Q function assists in executing the policy function.
In policy function evaluation, each state’s required plan of action, which
varies by state and action. Figure 4.5 demonstrates the development of a
generic BSM sample made by the current state (st ), the ground truth label
for the current state ( a∗ ), and the next step (st+1 ).
The DDQN network comprises three layers, each with ReLU activation
to ensure positive Q function. The network is trained with binary crossentropy between the Q-value estimate of the NN for the current state (qt )

and the reference value qre f . The qre f is derived by the current reward
and the next state Q-value denoted as qt+1 and the discount factor λ. The
reward is a binary output denoted by 1 or 0, which depicts correct or incorrect prediction ât . The value of the ground truth label for the current state
is represented by a∗t , and the predicted values are represented by â. If the
current and predicted state values are equal, the rewards are 1; otherwise,
they are 0. The predicted value of the current state is obtained by iterating the Q function with the current (st) and the values of the labels{{ a}}.
The iteration is represented as ( Q (st , {{ a}})), while a and p are possible
actions and cardinalities.
The maximum action value arga max ( Q (st , {{ a}})) generated from the
iteration is applied to E-greedy algorithm. The algorithm selects the probability value p or a random action with probability action 1-p, and this
selection step provides the predicted action ( â).
The Q-value for the next state (q̂ + 1) is determined using the target Q
function. The goal of this extra Q function (target Q function) is to prevent
2
the moving target effect when doing gradient descent over qˆt − qre f
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and the qre f ’s recursive dependency on the training network.
DWT-Based Optimized Anomaly BSMs Samples

F IGURE 4.5: Double deep Q network (DDQN) approach training
scheme
Source: Adapted from [78]

The DWT-DDQN parameter values are selected based on experiments performed on a validation set to optimize anomaly detection and identification
efficiency. The architecture of the proposed DWT-DDQN approach involves
fully connected NN comprising three layers, with ReLU activation for all layers,
including the last one to ensure a positive Q-value. DWT-DDQN method is
trained with a random dropout rate of 0.1, and a batch size of 128 is employed.
Additionally, batch normalization and ReLU activation functions are used in
layers, and Adam optimizer for TensorFlow is implemented in Python for
the binary cross-entropy minimization. Early stopping is introduced to track
validation set accuracy with a duration of 200 epochs to reduce the chance of
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over-fitting. The performance of DWT-DDQN method is discussed in Section
5.2.4.

4.1.5

Support Vector Machine (SVM)

Consider a dataset { x1 , x2 , ...x N }, where each xi ∈ R N represents a member of
the class of interest. The SVM’s goal is to find a hyperplane with the maximum
value that separates the outlier from the rest of the results in the dataset. We
can define a mapping function φ as a kernel mapping function N → F . To
differentiate the hyperplane, SVM solves the quadratic programming problem
shown below:
Minimize

1
1
w ∈ F , ξ, ρ kwk2 +
2
vN

N

∑ ξi − ρ

(4.30)

i =1

The problem is subject to (w, Φ ( xi )) ≥ ρ − ξ, ξ ≥ 0 ∀i = 1...N,
where w is a vector perpendicular to the hyperplane in F , ρ is the distance to
the origin, and N is the number of data points. A range of slack variables ξ i

≥ 0 is added to allow outliers to lie on the margin. The constant parameter
v represents the decision boundary’s FPR that classifies normal and abnormal
sensor readings in a range of (0, 1). The decision variables w define the most
generalizable linear decision boundary in an infinite-dimensional space to decide a region in the input space encompassing at least 1 − v percentage of the
data points.
The decision/slack variable ξ is used to penalize the degree of violation of
the constraints ((w, Φ ( xi )) ≥ ρ).
The result of the performance of SVM is shown in Section 5.2.4.

4.1.6

Ensemble Multi layer Perception (EMLP)

An EMLP method comprises a series of layers, each of which has neurons
attached to the next layer to create a unidirectional feed-forward structure.
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The method has m-layer that figures the dataset input-output pairs (~xi , yi ),
where yi represents the 1D output yi ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 and 1 denote abnormal
and normal sensor reading, respectively, on n-dimensional BSM input vector

~x = { x1 , x2 , ...xn }. The dataset input and output pair size is denoted as
X = {(~
x1 , y) , ..., (~x N , y N )}. For each hidden layer from l1 to lm−1 , the weight
sums and outputs are computed as follows:

−→ −→

sik = wik .zk−1 + bik
r

k −1
wkji .zkj −1
sik =bik + ∑ j=
1

f or i = 1, . . . , rk

(2)

Here, wkji is denoted as the weight of the link between ith neuron of lk layer
and jth neuron of lk−1 layer; ~x represents the input vector to the approach. The
bik represents the bias for i neuron in the layer lk , and rk represents the number
of neurons in layer lk ; further, sik denotes the product of the summation with the
bias of neurons i in layer lk .
The output neuron i in layer ik is denoted as zik and can be computed as
follows:

zik

 
= f h sik =




sk ,

sik > 0



0,

else

i

f or i = 1, . . . , rk

(3)

Here, f h is the activation function at hidden layer. Generally, for MLP, the
output z is obtained by the feed-forward mechanism. The computing output
ŷ that computes the output sensor reading into normal and abnormal value is
shown as
−→ −→

r

m −1
s1m =w1m .zm−1 + b1m = b1m + ∑ j=
wkj1 .zkj −1
1

ŷ =z1m = f z (s1m ) =

1
m
1 + e − s1
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(4)
(5)

The EMLP parameter values are selected based on the experiments performed on a validation set to optimize anomaly detection and identification
efficiency. This EMLP architecture involves two stacks of three hidden layers
and is trained with a random dropout rate of 0.1, and a batch size of 128 is employed. Additionally, batch normalization and ReLU activation functions are
used in layers, and Adam optimizer for TensorFlow is implemented in Python
for the binary cross-entropy minimization. The following parameters are implemented for the Adam optimization: learning rate, α = 0.001, batch size of
128,dropout rate of 0.1 and ReLU activation. Furthermore, early stopping is
introduced to track validation set accuracy with a duration of 200 epochs to reduce the chance of over-fitting. The performance obtained by using EMLP is
detailed in Section 5.2.4.

4.1.7

Bayesian Deep Learning-Empowered Discrete Wavelet
Transform (DWT-BDL)

The detection efficiency of the BDL approach is improved by proposing a new
framework (DWT-BDL) based on the reliance of DWT and BDL, as shown in
Figure 4.6. Prior to feeding the data into the BDL detection algorithm, DWT is
added to the BSM sensory information for denoising (as explained in section
4.1.3). The noisy sensory BSM data are decomposed by transforming them into
an orthogonal domain, followed by processing operations on the resulting coefficients. Eventually, through the reconstruction process, the sensory input is
transformed back to its original state.
The denoised reconstructed BSM sensory input is fed into the BDL algorithm for further examination and anomaly detection, as explained in Section
4.1.3. This stage of anomaly detection is achieved by first splitting the data into
training and testing datasets. The proposed approach is trained to develop a
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prediction on the training dataset, while the testing dataset is fed into the algorithm for prediction test.
To further improve the detection and identification efficiency of the BDL
algorithm, a new framework is developed based on the reliance of BDL and
DWT, as shown in Figure 4.6. In this approach, before feeding the data into the
BDL detection algorithm, DWT is added to the BSM sensory information for
denoising. The noisy sensory BSM data are decomposed into an orthogonal domain, followed by processing operations on the resulting coefficients. Eventually, through the reconstruction process, the sensory input is transformed back
to its original state based on the criteria discussed in Section 4.2.
The denoised reconstructed BSM sensory input is fed into the BDL algorithm
for further examination and anomaly detection. The performance results of the
proposed approach are shown in Section .
Classification Criterion of the Proposed Approach
This section provides a detailed description of the proposed method’s anomaly
detection in the CAV network, and Figure 4.6 gives a detailed description of
the pictorial representation. The value ~x is a vector of BSM sensory input of D
variables. The ~x is a piece of evidence to be predicted. Moreover, ck and M are
the relevant class outputs (ground truths) estimated by the proposed approach.
A value of 0 or 1 is assigned to ~ck variable, where 0 and 1 represent the normal
and anomalous information, respectively. Here, ~ck ∈ { anomalous, normal } ≡

~ck ∈ {0, 1} considering a binary classification.
The mathematical representation of the classification process can be
expressed using Bayes Theorem in C.2:
p(C = ~ck | M j , D = ~xi ) =

p M j | C = ~ck , D = ~xi p(C = ~ck | D = ~xi ) (4.31)
.
p( M j | D = ~xi )
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By application of total probability theorem, C.2 can be represented as shown
in 4.32.

p(C = ~ck | M j , D = ~xi ) =

P( M j | C = ~ck , D = ~xi ) p(C = ~ck | D = ~xi )
(4.32)
∑c∈(anomalous,normal ) [ p( M j | C = ck , D = ~xi ) p(C = ck | D = ~xi )]

From 4.32, it is assumed that the individual reports remain independent
[10]. From 4.33, the conditional probability of normal and anomalous information in the CAV network is deduced. From the conditional probability of normal
and anomalous information in vehicular networks, the following mathematical
expression is further deducted:

p ( anomalous | ~x ) + p (normal | ~x ) = 1

(4.33)

from 4.33, it can be inferred that ~
X is malicious when ~
X = 1 − p (hon | ~x ).
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F IGURE 4.6: Bayesian hierarchical framework for neural network

The values of BDL parameters are selected based on the series of experiments performed on a validation set to optimize anomaly detection and identification efficiency. In this case, the BDL architecture is assumed to comprise of
TensorFlow probability (TFP) of four hidden layers, with 20 nodes and one bias
in the first layer and ten nodes and one bias each in the rest of the layers. ReLU
activation function is applied to train the network, while Adam optimizer with
default learning rate minimizes the validation set binary cross-entropy loss. The
details of the performance of BDL are presented in Section 5.2.
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Chapter 5

Results and Discussion

5.1

Results: Machine-to-Machine (M2M) Model Detection Performance

This section presents the simulation results of the proposed and state-of-the-art
(SOTA) ensemble approaches, namely XGBoost and RandF. Their performances
are compared for attacking vehicle message densities. The performance metrics
such as AR, TPR, and FPR are used to demonstrate the proposed model’s behavior and its superiority over the other models.
Figure 5.1 provides the results of the proposed and SOTA approaches. It
can be seen that the proposed BPSO-XGBoost approach improves the detection performance of both XGBoost and RandF approaches in all the scenarios
of attack density. For instance, at attack density of 10 %, the accuracy of BPSOXGBoost approach increases by 0.02 and 0.04 over RandF and XGBoost, respectively. The proposed approach displays superior performance in accuracy over
the SOTA since the combined features of the proposed approach strengthen its
detection capability. The XGboost works with optimized parameters as a result
of the adaptive search ability of BPSO. As it is observed in Figure 5.1, generally
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the detection approaches show increased performance with high magnitude of
attacker vehicles. Here, the increase in accuracy is attributed to the fact that
a high attacker vehicle percentage in a network generates larger distribution,
which can deviate from the true values of the normal sensors’ behaviors. The
larger the anomaly distribution, the easier for the detection approaches to extract meaningful information in detecting anomaly present in the network.
The TPR performance of the approaches with different attacker densities
is simulated and results are presented in Figure 5.2. Results show that XGBoost and RandF performed similarly in all the attack densities. However, the
proposed approach consistently performed better than the XGBoost and RandF
and approached almost 100 % TPR value when the attack vehicles are increased
in the simulations. The proposed approach results in high detection accuracy
for the true event. For instance, at 10 % of attack density, the TPR performance
difference between the proposed approach and the other approaches is around
5 to 7 %.
The proposed approach’s strength compared to the conventional approaches is further demonstrated with FPR metric. Figure 5.3 indicates that
in all the attack density scenarios, the proposed approach exhibits a very
low misclassification rate of almost 2 % compared with the selected baseline
approaches. The performance improvement demonstrates the effectiveness of
BPSO in XGBoost parameter optimization, which strengthens the proposed
approach’s detection capacity.
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F IGURE 5.1: Accuracy vs. attacker percentage scenario

F IGURE 5.2: True positive rate vs. attacker densities
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*F IGURE 5.3: False positive rate vz. attacker densities

Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) Pre-Analysis of the Data
BSM variables are usually in time series format, and successive time series values are not necessarily independent but are strongly correlated. This makes
it difficult to establish successful feature selection strategies for the functions
that operate directly on time-series data. To mitigate the problem, DWT, which
comes with the flavor of both a feature extractor and denoising techniques, as
detailed in Section 4.1.3, can be applied to time series data to transform them
from a time domain to a frequency domain.
In this section, we mainly focus on the denoising of the BSM attributes
with DWT. The BSM data have some disturbances due to the noise from the
measurement and the estimated error, which may cause problems in the training phase of the anomaly detection approach. In addition, the inbuilt noise in
the system can induce an outlier effect, which can impact the performance of
the attack detection approaches. The details of the operation of DWT are examined on the selected BSM sensors and the simulation for the experiment is
carried out with Python.
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The BSM data are denoised to make them smoother and accelerate the convergence of the loss function during the training process of the proposed detection approach. Table 5.1 demonstrates the abnormal and denoised readings of
BSM attributes. On carrying out our simulations at d = 3 in various network
densities, c, results indicate that DWT presents finer coefficients of the noise
measurement with a decrease in standard deviation in all the three anomaly
cases. The effects of combining filtering and denoising process of DWT with
the proposed approach is shown in Section 5.2.
TABLE 5.1: Descriptive statistics of selected basic safety message
(BSM) variables
Instant anomaly (Network size m)

µ (Anomaly)

σ (Anomaly)

µ (Wavelet dB[12])

σ (Wavelet dB[12])

2000

10.307401

6.170231

10.300251

5.7634621

4000

10.307407

6.170261

10.300258

5.763563

6000

10.307414

6.170258

10.300262

5.7635907

8000

10.307417

6.1702566

10.300263

5.7635937

10,000

10.307415

6.170257

10.300264

5.7635903

Bias Anomaly (Network Size m)

µ (Anomaly)

σ (Anomaly)

µ (Wavelet dB[12])

σ (Wavelet dB[12])

2000

0.5829332

1.5610949

0.5813745

1.1946311

4000

0.53638434

1.581967

0.53705674

1.0952997

6000

0.6300388

1.7301117

0.6321792

1.0724595

8000

0.64839834

1.6975222

0.65079004

1.0431184

10,000

0.7417457

1.7784712

0.74250895

1.0478663

Gradual Drift Anomaly (Network Size m)

µ (Anomaly)

σ (Anomaly)

µ (Wavelet dB[12])

σ (Wavelet dB[12])

2000

0.07693122

0.910007

0.076246604

0.4898912

4000

0.07699456

0.9098382

0.0763265

0.49061427

6000

0.07699457

0.908578

0.07632571

0.49055964

8000

0.07699094

0.9098535

0.07632209

0.49055964

10,000

0.07699085

0.9098535

0.07632202

0.49055642
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5.2

Results and Discussion

This section shows the results of the analysis of anomaly detection approaches
discussed in Section 4.1.2. The detection performances of the different approaches are obtained by training and testing them for a specific category of
anomaly or in the presence of all the anomaly types.
In this study, three types of the anomaly are simulated with CAV dataset
with varying anomaly duration d, scaling factor denoted as ci for varying
anomaly network densities distribution, and the anomaly rate denoted as η.
The performances of CNN, BDL, and the proposed approach (DWT-BDL) are
drawn from the variation of these parameters in detecting and identifying
abnormal sensor behaviors. The detection approaches are implemented with
ML libraries, namely TensorFlow and TFP, and Python packages. The dataset
was trained, validated, and tested in 60 %, 20 %, and 20 % ratio, respectively.
The validation and training sets are used to tune the parameters of the selected
detection approaches, and different test sets are used to assess and measure
the performance of the detection approaches. Each simulation is repeated 15
times with different seeds to achieve statically invariant outcomes for higher
confidence. The performance of the selected approaches is evaluated in terms
of accuracy, precision, sensitivity, and F1 − score.

5.2.1

Comparison of the Proposed DWT-BDL Approach and
Conventional Approaches Under Single Anomaly System

This section evaluates the performances of the proposed DWT-BDL approach
and the conventional detection approaches under a single anomaly system.
Performance evaluations are carried out on the densities and duration of an
anomaly in the CAV network. Different datasets, each with a specific type of
anomaly, are generated, with anomaly incidence rate η, duration of anomaly d,
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and scaling factor ci for varying network densities. The performance evaluations of the detection approaches are carried out on varying anomaly densities
and duration on the three types of anomalies.
Impact of Network Density on Anomaly Detection
(i) Instant anomaly
Figure 5.4 shows the performance of the anomaly detection approaches at
different densities of anomaly distribution. At a low density of anomaly
distribution, the proposed approach performs better than the SOTA approaches in all scenarios of instant anomaly distributions. For instance,
for c × N (0, 0.01) with c = 2000, CNN and BDL have the performance
values of 85.70 %, 85.00 %, 85.00 % and 87.10 %, as can be seen in Figures
5.4a and 5.4c. The same Figures demonstrate that at the same condition,
the proposed approach shows improvement over SOTA approaches, with
performance gains of 4.3 % and 2.7 % compared to CNN and 2.9 % and
1.9 % compared to BDL. Similarly, Figure 5.4d also illustrates the superiority of the proposed approach. However, the CNN approach in this
scenario maintained a lead performance in some cases of c × N (0, 0.01)
in the simulation, as shown in Figure 5.4b.
At high values ofc × N (0, 0.01), the proposed approach demonstrates superior performance over BDL and CNN in all the performance metrics
except in few cases of the accuracy metric (see Figures 5.4b), where CNN
indicates slight performance gains. However, the proposed approach outperforms CNN and BDL in all the cases ofc × N (0, 0.01). For instance, at
c = 10000, the proposed approach’s sensitivity shows performance gains
of 5.00 % and 4.00 % compared to BDL and CNN, respectively. The proposed approach shows significant performance across all the performance
metrics, as seen in Figure 5.4.
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It can be generalized that as the density of anomaly distribution decreases,
all the detection approaches exhibit low performance. This low performance in anomaly detection indicates the relevance of c in the anomaly
detection system. The consistent superior performance of the proposed
approach in all the metrics is due to the combination of BDL and DWT,
which enhances the anomaly detection capability. The proposed approach
utilizes the decomposition and denoising capability of DWT and couples
with the robust BDL approach for decision-making.
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F IGURE 5.4: Detection performance of CNN, BDL, and the proposed approach during the instance anomaly scenario
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(ii) Bias anomaly
Figure 5.5 presents the performance results of BDL, CNN, and the
proposed detection approach for bias anomaly. As demonstrated in the
simulations, at low U (0, c), the BDL approach performs better than the
CNN. Further, the proposed approach outperforms both BDL and CNN
approaches in all the metrics at low anomaly density distributions. For
example, as shown in Figure 5.5b, BDL improves in accuracy metric
by approximately 5.2 % in comparison to CNN, while the proposed
approach displays performance gains of 1.2 % and 5.2 % over BDL and
CNN, respectively, when c = 2000 samples are drawn from U (0, c).
Moreover, at c = 10,000 in the simulation, the efficiency of the detection
approaches increases as the density of anomaly distribution increases in
the CAV network. Detection approaches in this anomaly (i.e., attack) case
show similar behavior in the instant anomaly case. The distribution is
drawn from a fixed random variable U (0, c) and duration d = 3. As illustrated in Figure 5.5c, the proposed approach shows improvement in
sensitivity metric over BDL and CNN by about 4.50 % and 2.60 %, respectively. Similarly, Figures 5.5a and 5.5d depict the performance of the detection approaches on F1 − score and precision metrics. Results indicate
the superiority of the proposed approach over the baseline approaches for
different densities of the anomaly distribution in the bias anomaly type.
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F IGURE 5.5: Detection performance of CNN, BDL, and the proposed approach during the bias anomaly scenario
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(iii) Gradual drift anomaly
Figure 5.8 shows the results of the BDL, CNN, and the proposed approach
for gradual drift anomaly detection. This anomaly involves a linearly
increasing set of values in the sensor reading, making it challenging to
identify and discern the onset of abnormality from normal sensor values.
We utilize a vector of linearly increasing values from 0 to c, which is denoted by linspace (0, c). In general, for a low density of linspace (0, c) in
the network, BDL outperforms the CNN. Figures 5.6a and 5.6d depict the
BDL approach’s performance at c value of 2000 for F1 − score and precision metrics, where the BDL approach outperforms the CNN approach by
about 2.00 % and 14.10 %, respectively. However, at a high linspace (0, c) in
the network, CNN consistently outperforms BDL in all the simulation outputs. For instance, when the linspace (0, c) is scaled by c = 10,000, CNN’s
F1 − score and precision metrics improve by 2.4 % and 3.00 %, respectively,
over the BDL approach.
Moreover, the proposed approach’s anomaly detection performance for
gradual drift anomaly shows a significant improvement at low and high
density of the anomaly distributions compared to the baseline approaches.
For instance, as illustrated in Figures 5.6a, 5.6d, and 5.6c, the proposed
approach shows performance gains of about 9.00 %, 16.00 %, and 20.00 %
over CNN approach and about 6.95 %, 1.95 % and 2 % over BDL, in F1 −
score, precision, and sensitivity metrics, respectively. Further, at a high
value of c, the approach’s detection performance increases across all the
metrics. By intuition, larger anomaly distribution facilitates the extraction
of meaningful information required by the detection approaches to detect
the presence of an anomaly in the CAV network. In general, the proposed
approach outperforms CNN and BDL. For instance, at c = 10,000, the
proposed approach demonstrates superior performance in the F1 − score,
precision, and sensitivity metrics by about 2.40 %, 1.80 %, and 2.60 % and
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2.41 %, 2.68 %, and 4.90 % over CNN and BDL approaches, respectively.
In addition, the proposed approach improves upon the detection performance of both CNN and BDL.
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F IGURE 5.6: Detection performance of the CNN, BDL, and the proposed approach during the gradual drift anomaly scenario
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Impact of Attack Duration
A set of simulations is carried out to demonstrate the performances of the different detection approaches with respect to varying anomaly duration di ∈ (3, 4, 7)
at fixed density of anomaly distribution U (0, c)), with ci ∈ (2000, 4000, 6000)
for the bias and gradual drift types of anomaly. As indicated in each of the
subplots in Figure 5.7 – 5.9, for bias anomaly, each of the subplots has a varying anomaly duration at fixed anomaly density distribution. Also, Tables 5.2–
5.4 illustrate the same experimental setting on gradual drift anomaly type with
varying anomaly duration and fixed density of anomaly distribution.
Bias Anomaly Setting
Figures 5.7a–5.7c depict the performances of the detection approaches in terms
of the F1 − score. Figure 5.7a shows that the detection performances of the different approaches considered in this context increase with a longer duration of
anomaly, with anomaly distribution drawn from a fixed U (0, c)) distribution.
Moreover, in Figures 5.7b and 5.7c, the proposed approach shows a similar pattern of improvement in detection performance with an increase in d and a different fixed U (0, c). In general, results from the selected performance metrics
show that the different approaches’ overall detection efficiency increases consistently with increase in the magnitude of both d and U (0, c) distribution. For
instance, Figure 5.7c with anomaly distribution U (0, 6000) shows better performance than Figures 5.7a and 5.7b with distributions U (0, 2000) and U (0, 4000),
respectively, with the same di ∈ (3, 4, 7).
Further, in Figures 5.8a–5.8c and Figures 5.9a–5.9c, the detection approaches’ sensitivity and precision results consistently improve with the
increase in both in d and U (0, c). However, an exception occurs in Figures 5.8b
and 5.8c with anomaly duration d = 7. In this case, an increase in the anomaly
duration and distribution appears not to affect the proposed approach’s
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precision results since the detection approach could not detect the variation in
the two anomaly distributions. However, the misclassification rate presented
in both cases is not significant.
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Gradual Drift Anomaly Setting
A similar simulation is carried out for gradual drift anomaly. The simulation
uses a vector of linearly increasing values from 0 to ci ∈ (2000, 4000, 6000), denoted by the linspace (0, c) function. Also, the various values of d, d = {3, 4, 7},
and the density of the anomaly distribution, linspace (0, c), are taken into account.
Tables 5.2–5.4 show the results of the different approaches during the gradual drift anomaly scenario.The detection approaches generally do not display
significant improvement in the detection capability compared with the bias
anomaly cases. However, at high values of d and linspace (0, c), the detection
approaches appear to have an increase in detection strength. For instance in Tables 5.2–5.4, at low duration and magnitude of anomalous sensor distribution,
BDL performs better than the CNN approach. However, the detection performance of the CNN approach increases with anomaly duration d and magnitude
linspace (0, c).The effect of the sliding window function in the CNN approach
can increase the CNN performance.
As seen in Tables 5.2–5.4, the proposed approach outperforms both CNN
and BDL approaches across all the experiments. For example, in row 3 of Table
5.2, the proposed approach’s sensitivity, precision, and F1 − score metrics increase by 6.98%, 7.37%, and 7.32%, respectively, compared to the CNN approach
and by 9.10%, 11.89%, and 9.37%, respectively, compared to the BDL approach.
Results in Table 5.3 also indicate that the proposed approach outperforms CNN
and BDL. For instance, in the same row 3, the proposed approach’s sensitivity, precision, and F1 − score increase by 0.33%, 2.85%, and 4.8%, respectively,
compared to the CNN and 3.18%, 5.68%, and 9.7%, respectively, compared to
BDL.
Similarly, Table 5.4 presents the values of the detection approaches applied in the experiment with linspace (0, 2000), where row 3 of the investigation
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demonstrates the proposed approach’s superior performance compared to BDL,
and CNN approaches. For example, with the proposed approach, the sensitivity, precision, and F1 − score increase by 8.01%, 4.6%, and 9.33%, respectively,
relative to CNN and by 3.96%, 3.74%, and 3.9%, respectively, relative to BDL.
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TABLE 5.2: Detection performance of the approaches during the drift anomaly scenario, with U (0, 6000)

Duration, d
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TABLE 5.3: Detection performance of the approaches during the drift anomaly scenario, with U (0, 4000)
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TABLE 5.4: Detection performance of the approaches during the drift anomaly scenario, with U (0, 2000)

Duration, d

Anomaly distribution density

CNN(%)

89.94

98.57

99.46

F1 − score

Discussion on the Performances of the Detection Approaches During the
Single Anomaly Scenario
As seen in the experiments, the performance of the detection approaches
increases significantly with the increase in the value of anomaly duration d
and considered network density distribution, c × N (0, 0.01), U (0, c), and
linspace (0, c). By intuition, a larger distribution causes a larger deviation from
the true values of the normal sensors’ behaviors.Thus, the greater the effectiveness of the approaches in extracting enough features to detect anomalies in the
CAV network.
Moreover, the higher performance of the detection approaches with a
longer duration can be attributed to the fact that a longer duration gives
detection approaches the time to accumulate knowledge about the behaviors
and anomaly impacts in a CAV network.
Overall, in the single attack system, as shown in Section 5.2.1, the detection
approaches can generalize and correctly classify previous unseen observations
with similar distribution (test set) throughout the experiment by training on
representative training sets. However, CAV anomaly detection approaches can
experience abnormalities for which they have not been specifically trained in
practice. Details of the incidents of unseen observations are expressed in the
multiple anomaly/attack scenarios discussed in Section 5.2.2.
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5.2.2

Performance of the Approaches During the Multiple
Anomaly Scenario

This section addresses a specific detection approach’s effectiveness and reliability by subjecting it to multiple anomaly scenarios. Exposure to varying attributes of abnormal behaviors gives insight into the performances of these approaches. The attribute is achieved in the test dataset by integrating the three
anomaly types discussed in Section 3.1.3. The multiple anomalies are modeled
with 100000 × N (0, 7), U (0, 6000), linspace (0, 6000), and d = 7. Having been
trained on one of the anomaly types, an investigation is carried out on generalizing the detection approaches during the unobserved multiple anomaly
scenarios. In the experimental settings, the impacts of the η on the three different sensors are only considered. Evaluation performance of the detection
approaches are carried out at η = 10% and η = 50%. Further, the simulation
of the detection approaches are conducted several times to ensure statistical relevance by providing the mean performance of 95 % credible interval for BDL,
DWT-BDL, and confidence intervals for CNN, respectively.
Figure 5.10 depicts the performance of the study’s detection approaches
at η = 50% during the multiple anomaly scenario. The η-values are set high
to capture the selected approach’s behaviors and detection capabilities for the
threat that can pose considerable risk to the CAV network’s operation. Results
indicate the performance variations of the detection approaches across the sensor readings in all the metrics in the simulations.In particular, for RoC sensor, it
is observed that the approaches’ performance values are worse compared with
the Ax and speed sensors, which appear to show much smoother reading overtime under the same anomaly scenario. The RoC sensor behaviors are partly attributed to the tremendous variation in the consecutive readings. The results in
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Figure 5.10 validate the performance degradation of the detection on the unobserved abnormal RoC sensor values. However, the proposed approach demonstrates a lead performance in all the scenarios with the values of 4.92 ± 0.009 and
6.95 ± 0.009 over BDL and CNN, respectively, considering the worst-case scenario of RoC sensor analysis. In the same vein, Figures 5.10b to 5.10d replicate
the same performance improvement with the use of the proposed approach.
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F IGURE 5.10: Detection performance at 95% CI and CRI across 15
to 20 different executions for all three approaches, at anomaly rate
η = 50% and in the presence of all the types of anomalies

A similar experiment is also conducted with all the anomaly types to investigate the behaviors of the detection approaches in the CAV system for a
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low value of η = 10% and d = 7. As shown in Figure 5.11, the three selected
approaches’ detection performances vary among various sensors. Again, the
three detection approaches show the lowest performance values when applied
to abnormal RoC sensor (BSM) values at this simulation analysis stage. This
could be attributed to the poor performance of the detection approaches to the
variation in the input read sequence of RoC sensor (BSM) readings.
At η set to 10%, the approaches show a better performance classification
accuracy. Generally, the approaches do not show significant improvement in
performances on other metrics, especially in Figure 5.11a, when compared to
η = 50 % in Figure 5.10a. The observation complies with intuition, as the lower
value of η makes the anomaly more elusive and thus more challenging to detect. Conversely, a high detection accuracy, as shown in Figure 5.11b, may be
due to the imbalanced nature of the BSM samples. Thus, the classification accuracy appears to favor the more representative class [80]. Accuracy metric may
not be an appropriate performance metric for imbalanced data. Furthermore, as
indicated in Figures 5.11c and 5.11d, the proposed approach demonstrates significant performance improvement in precision and sensitivity plots over BDL
and CNN.
The performance evaluations of the detection approaches in this context of
simulation are mainly focused on F1 − score, which provides more insights into
the strength of the detection approaches in an imbalance class scenario [81].
From the results obtained for F1 − score, as presented in Figure 5.11a, it can
be concluded that the BDL outperforms the CNN. Moreover, the proposed approach significantly improves performance over the BDL and CNN approaches,
with values of 4.36 ± 0.010 and 6.45 ± 0.010.
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F IGURE 5.11: Detection performance at 95% CI and CRI across 15
to 20 different executions for all three approaches, at anomaly rate
η = 10% and in the presence of all the types of anomalies

Furthermore, in the simulation setting, CNN is subjected to the same DWT
denoising, and the performance is validated with the proposed approach. The
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AUC of the receiver operating characteristics curve is also computed to validate the proposed approach’s performance and reliability during gradual drift
anomaly scenario at η = 10 % and η = 50 %, respectively.
In the simulation setting, the detection approach is trained based on the
bias and instant anomaly types, and the trained detection approaches are applied on the gradual drift anomaly dataset. Then, the performance of the trained
approaches on the gradual drift anomaly test set is validated. Figures ?? and
5.12 show that the proposed approach demonstrates superior performances
than BDL, CNN, and DWT-CNN. For instance, in Figure 5.13a, at η = 10 %,
the proposed approach displays a performance gain of 1.9 %, 7.4 %, and 3.5 %
over DWT-CNN, BDL, and CNN, respectively. At the same time, Figure 5.13b
shows that when η = 50 %, the proposed approach displays improved values of 2.2 %, 8.4 %, and 3.4 % compared with DWT-CNN, BDL, and CNN approaches, respectively. Similarly, Figure 5.13c indicates that the proposed approach demonstrates a significant improvement through values of 0.7 %, 5.3 %,
and 1.1 % compared with DWT-CNN, BDL, and CNN approaches, respectively.
Finally, Figure 5.13d also proves that the proposed approach provides a significant improvement in performance with values of 2.1 %, 0.4 %, and 2.6 % over
DWT-CNN, BDL, and CNN, respectively.
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1.0

Discussion on the Performances of the Detection Approaches During
Multiple Anomaly Scenario

The experiment aims to establish a likely situation of multiple anomalies
(i.e., attacks) that depicts real-life scenarios vulnerable to multiple anomalies/attacks. The proposed approach demonstrates good performances due
to the prior probability of the Bayesian approach, which establishes synergies/fusions among heterogeneous information, which in turn aid in the
classification of out-of-distribution instances as unknowns. The synergy/fusion
strategy provides impressive detection capability to detect unknown anomalies/attacks in a CAV network [82], [83].

5.2.3

Approaches Under Single Anomaly System Under DWTBDL Proposed Approach

Further evaluation is made with the comparison of the proposed DWT-BDL
with the combined convolutional neural network with attention-based long
short term memory (CNN-ALSTM) [84] and Kalman filter-convolutional neural
network (KF-CNN) [84].
The performance of the three approaches are measured for F1-score, precision and sensitivity. F1-score is the harmonic mean of sensitivity and precision
metrics, respectively. In comparison, precision is the proportion of abnormal
sensor values among those predicted to be anomalous. Sensitivity access is the
proportion of the correctly detected abnormal sensor values from the total number.
The proposed DWT-BDL approach during the comparative analysis with
the CNN-ALSTM and KF-CNN approaches are evaluated on the test sample of
the Gradual drift anomaly dataset, and the results are shown in Tables 5.5 and
5.6 respectively. Gradual drift anomaly type is selected to know the strength of
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the proposed approach with baseline approaches. Each approach is executed
on the abnormal senor reading (Gradual drift) ten times, and the mean value
and the confidence interval (C.I.) are computed. The confidence interval can be
computed as follows:

Con f idence interval (C.I.) = x̄ ± z ∗

σ
n

(5.1)

where x̄ is the mean values of the different output results of the metrics, z is
the z-score, σ is the standard deviation and n is the sample size of the data.
q
N
1
The σ is obtained as follows: σ =
N ∑i =1 ( xi − x̄ ) where N is the number
of different simulation outputs considered in the simulation, xi is the output
of the individual simulation output and x̄ is the mean based on the number of
simulations.
In the simulation, emphasis is laid on the approach’s performance on the
F1-score, and sensitivity metrics for classification and the performance values
of the metrics are highlighted in bold font in the two cases of gradual anomaly
distributions (linspace(0, 2000), linspace(0, 10000). F1-score provides more insight on the strength of a detection mechanism in the event of imbalance dataset
[81], while sensitivity directly impacts the reliability of fused data in CAV [22].
At a very high anomaly distribution, the detection approach’s performances
increase across all the metrics. By intuition, larger anomaly distribution facilitates the extraction of meaningful information required to detect the presence
of an anomaly in the CAV network [85], [22] At linspace(0, 10000), the proposed
approach demonstrates superior performance in the F1 − score and sensitivity
metrics as shown with the bold font in Table 5.5 with values of 97 ± 0.008,
and 97.08 ± 0.009 for F1-score and sensitivity metrics. Though in this case of
anomaly distribution, CNN-ALSTM has a better precision performance than
the DWT-BDL and KF-CNN approaches. However, the proposed DWT-BDL
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approach has a more precise value of (C.I.), which indicates a more reliable output. A similar simulation is carried out at a low density of gradual drift anomaly
distribution of linspace(0, 2000). As demonstrated in Table 5.6 with bold font,
the proposed approach performs better than the state-of-the-art (SOTA) with
89.39 ± 0.035 and 87.13 ± 0.016 in F1-score and sensitivity metrics, respectively.
TABLE 5.5: Detection Performance and the 95 % confidence
interval across 10 different executions for the three approaches, at
anomaly rate of 10 %, duration 7 with respect to Gradual drift
anomaly type with anomaly distribution of linspace(0, 10000).

Approach

DWT-BDL

CNN-ALSTM

KF-CNN-1D

Metric

Mean ( x̄ )

C.I.

F1-score

97.60

97.60 ± 0.008

Precision

96.30

96.30 ± 0.006

Sensitivity

97.08

97.08± 0.009

F1-score

93.45

93.45 ± 0.017

Precision

96.67

96.67 ± 0.009

Sensitivity

94.51

94.51±0.015

F1-score

93.39

93.39 ± 0.019

Precision

96.15

96.15 ± 0.016

Sensitivity

95.64

95.64±0.014
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TABLE 5.6: Detection Performance and the 95 % confidence
interval across 10 different executions for the three approaches, at
anomaly rate of 10 %, duration of 7 with respect to Gradual drift
anomaly type with anomaly distribution of linspace(0, 2000).

Approach

DWT-BDL

CNN-ALSTM

KF-CNN-1D

Metric

Mean ( x̄ )

C.I.

F1-score

89.38

89.38 ± 0.035

Precision

93.29

93.29 ± 0.023

Sensitivity

87.13

87.13± 0.016

F1-score

87.28

87.28 ± 0.037

Precision

92.92

92.92 ± 0.021

Sensitivity

82.65

82.65±0.021

F1-score

85.48

85.48 ± 0.042

Precision

88.28

88.28 ± 0.056

Sensitivity

81.32

81.32±0.002

In addition, the complexity of detection approach is attributed to the training time as indicated in [86]–[88]. This assumption is made in this context. From
the training time for the two gradual drift anomaly distributions as indicated in
Table 5.7, our proposed DWT-BDL takes a longer time in its training process.
At the same time, CNN-ALSTM has a shorter training process with values of
147, and 149 as indicate with bold font in the two gradual drift anomaly cases.
It is assumed that the proposed approach is more complex than the baseline
approach in this context.
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TABLE 5.7: Approach complexity based on training time

Gradual drift anomaly distribution
linspace(0, 2000)

linspace(0, 10000)

5.2.4

Approach

Training Time(s)

DWT-BDL

282

CNN-ALSTM

147

KF-CNN

153

DWT-BDL

297

CNN-ALSTM

149

KF-CNN

156

Approaches Under Multiple Anomaly System Under
DWT-DDQN Proposed Approach

This section first runs simulations to select the best discount factor, γ value,
that presents the best reward with minimum loss. A series of simulations of
various γ values ranging from 0 to 1 are conducted. The finding shows that
γ values that fall within the range, as seen in Figure 5.13, provide the desired
outcomes, with γ = 0 being the best. If γ = 0, the agent would be completely
naive and only learn about actions that produce an immediate reward. If γ = 1,
the agent would weigh each of its actions against the total of all future rewards
[89]. Here, the performance metrics are F1 − score and sensitivity. The value of
γ = 0 is kept constant during the modeling, which fits the unstable topology of
the CAVs network, where most actions do not have long-lasting consequences.
The gradual drift anomaly type is also adopted as discussed in Section
5.2, with the same parameters, to test the capability of the approach proposed
in Section 4.1.4 and compare its performances with the available approaches
discussed in Sections 4.1.5–4.1.6. Here, EMLP and SVM approaches are selected
because of their extensive use in CAV anomaly detection [90].
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In Figures 5.14 and 5.15, the results in terms of F1 − score and sensitivity
metrics show that the proposed DWT-DDQN approach performs better than
EMLP and SVM approaches. This is because the proposed DWT-DDQN approach exploits both DWT’s and DDQN’s ability to enhance results. Figure
5.14a indicates that at η = 10 %, the abnormal readings become more difficult to
detect. However, at c = 10000, the DWT-DDQN provides a significant improvement (up to 10 % and 20 % ) in F1-score when compared to SVM and EMLP. The
proposed approach achieves a promising performance fit due to the combination of DWT and DDQN features. EMLP and SVM approaches could not have
good results at this density of anomaly distribution simply because EMLP, for
example, does not show strong knowledge of dependence among sequences,
which is important in time series datasets like BSMs [91]. Moreover, SVM could
not detect anomalies at a small value of η since it depends on label; in other
words, SVM lacks the quality of extracting meaningful information from data
features to enable it to have good detection capability at small anomaly rates
[11].
The performance of the proposed approach to an η value ( η = 50 %) that
may pose a significant risk to the operation of the CAV network is further validated. At this point, results show a better performance across approaches in
F1 − score metric when compared with η = 10%. As seen in Figure 5.14a, MLP
and SVM approaches show similar performances at c = 10, 000. However, the
approaches show better performance in terms of F1 − score when compared
with a performance at η = 10 %. This improvement in detection could be due
to the increase in the anomaly involved in the CAV network at this point. Results prove that the proposed approach outperforms EMLP and SVM in this
case, with efficiency gains of 7 % at c = 10, 000 for F1 − score metric.
Similarly, Figures 5.15a and 5.15b present performances in terms of sensitivity metric. It can be seen that DWT-DDQN demonstrates superior outcomes
than EMLP and SVM at both η = 10 % and η = 50 %. In Figure 5.15a, the
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proposed approach presents significant improvement, which is represented by
values of 9% and 3% at c = 10000 for EMLP and SVM, respectively. At a high
value of η (η = 50 %), as indicated in Figure 5.15b, the approaches exhibit slight
improvement when compared with Figure 5.15a. Again, the proposed approach
significantly outperforms SOTA approaches by about 12 % and 8 % compared
with EMLP and SVM, respectively, at same reference point of c=1000. Further,
EMLP performs better than SVM at high values of c, as can be seen in Figures
5.15a and 5.15b, respectively.
The proposed and SOTA approaches perform better as the value of η increases in the CAV network. This observation is aligned with expectation since
smaller η values make the anomaly more challenging to detect.
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( D ) Comparison of rewards and losses at different
episodes of DDQN training at = 0.0.

( B ) Comparison of rewards and losses at different
episodes of DDQN training at γ = 0.4. η =50%.

F IGURE 5.13: Comparison of rewards and losses at different episodes of DDQN training at various γ values

( C ) Comparison of rewards and losses at different
episodes of DDQN training at γ = 0.0.

( A ) Comparison of rewards and losses at different
episodes of DDQN training at γ = 0.0.
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of F1 − score and sensitivity metrics during the gradual drift
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The chapter demonstrates the performance of the detection approaches
in the CAV and M2M networks. Results prove the effectiveness of ML/DL
approaches in detecting abnormal sensor values (BSMs) in CAV and M2M
networks. The proposed approaches such as BPSO-XGBoost, DWT-BDL, and
DWT-DDQN provide better results than the SOTA.
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Chapter 6

Conclusion and Future Work

6.1

Conclusion

CAVs are projected to transform today’s transportation system into a highly efficient, automated, and intelligent one. In the near future, CAVs with varying
levels of automation and connection are projected to cut travel time, enhance
trip comfort, improve fuel efficiency, and minimize fatal accidents. Although
expanding the use of CAV technology is expected to provide several benefits,
it may also introduce difficulties in terms of safety, security, and privacy. In
this context, recent records on crash events and successful automobile cyberattacks demonstrate that existing autonomous systems cannot manage unexpected complicated situations. This is why the CAV anomaly detection system’s
robustness is significant for the future.
This thesis proposes anomaly detection approaches to safeguard CAVs
against abnormal sensor behavior or malicious cyberattacks. The proposed
approaches with a combination of DWT with BDL and DDQN aim to detect
anomalous information and denoise the sensor data in the CAV network.
Specifically, simulations are carried out in two phases, one with a single
anomaly and another with multiple anomaly scenarios. In the single anomaly
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scenario, performances of the proposed anomaly detection approaches are
compared with that of the SOTA for a single sensor data. The results show that
the combined approaches improve on individual strengths. The results of the
simulation indicate that the proposed DWT-BDL approach results in performance gains in terms of sensitivity, precision, and F1 − score during gradual
drift anomaly, with improvements of 6.98%, 9.10%, and 7.37%, respectively,
when compared with BDL and 11.89%, 7.32%, and 9.37%, respectively, when
compared with CNN baseline approach.
Furthermore, the thesis proposes an innovative data-driven anomaly detection approach that combines DWT and DDQN methods in CAVs. The DDQN
is modified to accommodate classification by taking the state as the data feature and the label as the action. The DWT and DDQN are combined to enhance anomaly detection performance and noise filtering in the CAV networks.
The DWT smoothens the BSM sensor reading before the BSMs are fed into the
DDQN approach. F1 − score and sensitivity are used to access the performance
of the proposed approach. As per the simulation results, the proposed DWTBDL approach outperforms the baseline EMLP approach by about 20% and 10%
and SVM approach by about 12% and 8% at low and high anomaly density distributions, respectively.
To facilitate detailed experiments on the effects of the anomaly parameters
in the CAV setting, we use anomaly parameters such as the distribution, duration, and incident rate. Moreover, extensive simulations are run to investigate
the effects of anomaly type, duration, and density of anomaly distribution. As
presented in Section 5.2, results indicate that the performance of the different
approaches generally improves with the increase in the magnitude of anomaly
distribution and duration for different anomaly types, given that the density of
anomaly is drawn from the same distribution.
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In another work focused on the VBM2M-C setting, the VBM2M-C deals
with modeling a scenario that depicts a vehicular communication setting that
generates BSM features. In this setting, vehicles maintain inter-operability and
reliable connection among themselves. The simulation involves some percentage of the vehicles being configured to communicate malicious messages for
their benefit.
In this thesis, insight is drawn on the ML models’ applicability in VBM2MC in detecting abnormal behaviors. In this case, the proposed approach is a
combination of BPSO and XGoost. The primary essence of integrating BPSO
is to serve as an optimizer to the XGBoost approach. The proposed BPSOXGBoost approach is applied to the generated BSM input vector, and the capability of detecting abnormal behavior in the network is evaluated. The ability
of the proposed approach to capture anomalous activities are demonstrated in
Section 5.1.
Further, the proposed approach’s detection potential is evaluated, and
the results of the combination of two characteristics are shown in Section 5.1.
The AR, TPR, and FPR presented earlier in this thesis work show the performance values for the respective probability of attacks and the performance
values of the individual detection approaches. The proposed method’s performance shows significant improvements up to about 9%, 7% performance gain,
and 2% lower than XGBoost and 4%, 9% performance gains, and 7% less compared to RF.
Furthermore, in the work, the performance of the proposed DWT-BDL is
evaluated on gradual drift anomaly type, and the performance is compared
with CNN-ALSTM and KF-CNN. The detection approaches’ output is quantified in terms of F1-score, sensitivity and precision metrics.
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At a high and low density of gradual drift anomaly distribution, the proposed approach demonstrates superior performance in F1 − score and sensitivity metrics with values of 97 ± 0.008 and 97.08 ± 0.009 and 89.39 ± 0.035 and
87.13 ± 0.016.
Limitation of the thesis
1. The abnormal values of sensors used in the experiments are simulated
and relies on the previous literature research, primarily because this form
of data is not yet readily available. The tests are limited to onboard sensors
due to the lack of data on CAVs.
2. Analysis of advanced computational complexity of the selected approaches and deployment to chips were not carried out in the work.
3. Additionally, the proposed DWT-BDL approach provides a better
anomaly detection performance but has little complexity based on the
training time.

Though vehicle communication is driven by a more

powerful computer that accommodates complexity.
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6.2

Future Work

Emergency safety and robust and reliable CAV systems are key research fields
for the coming years. The following items can extend and complement the research work presented in this thesis:
1. Distinguishing between anomalies and malicious information
In potential research, distinguishing between anomalous and malicious
information can be beneficial, as this can affect the action taken to minimize the consequences. Identifying the type of anomaly that occurs can
also be advantageous. The ability to figure out the type of anomaly will,
in turn, allow certain real-life actions to be developed to minimize the
impact of cyberattacks, thus contributing to the development of effective
defensive mechanisms.
2. Computational complexity and communication overhead estimation
Estimating the memory and processor requirements for each detection
approach’s architecture will provide low communication overhead and
guidance on which approach is more applicable in a resource-constrained
environment like vehicles.
3. Addition of authentication schemes
Although authentication and encryption are outside this study’s scope,
all the network messages are believed to be authenticated. However, the
CAV system can be enhanced with a practical, lightweight authentication
scheme ideal for CAV networks, such as group signature or modified digital signature elliptical curve, to provide authentication of the sensor data
to have a secure system.
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Appendix B

Mathematical Notations

Ord
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Variable
S (n)
m j,k
ED
No
Nm
α
η
N
U
d
µ
m
σ
f (n)
di,k
c j,k
ε (t) 
T Vi,j
vi
q
Ax
β

Unit and /or Observations
Original signal / dBm
Wavelet coefficient as a result of wavelet decomposition
Error between the data
Number of output variables
Number of candidates
Optimization parameter
Incident/anomaly rate
Normal distribution
Uniform distribution
Anomaly duration/(s)
Mean
Vehicular density
Standard deviation
Estimated wavelet coefficient
Detailed coefficient
Approximate coefficient
Estimated wavelet
Transfer function
Velocity m/s
Percentage of malicious information / %
Lateral acceleration
Optimization parameter
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Appendix C

Mathematical Derivations and
Illustrations
Bayesian classification with Three Variables
The prior distribution of the parameter(s) before any observation is experienced
is given by p (C | D ). This prior distribution might not be determined easily.; in
such case Jeffery’s prior is used to get prior distribution before the update of a
newer observation. The sampling distribution or likelihood is the distribution

of the observed data based on condition of its parameters, i.e. p M j | C The
 R

marginal likelihood p M j | D = p M j | C, D dC
The posterior distribution is the distribution of the parameter(s) after having considered of the observed data.

p(C,M j ,D )
p C | Mj , D =
p( M j ,D )

=
=
=

p( M j |C,D ) p(C,D )
p( M j ,D )
p( M j |C,D ) p(C | D ) p( D )
p( M j ,D )
p( M j |C,D ) p(C | D ) p( D )
p( M j | D ) p( D )
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=

p( M j |C,D ) p(C | D )
p( Mj | D )


∝ p M j | C, D p (C | D )

Particle Swarm Optimization position and velocity
Mathematically, the particle’s position and velocity are expressed as follows:
Xi = ( Xi1 , Xi2 , ..., Xik ) , Xij ∈ {0, 1} , j = 1,2,3,..., K
Vi = (Vi1 , Vi2 , ..., Vik ) , Vij ∈ {−Vmax , Vmax }, j = 1,2,3, ..., K
where Xi position represents a solution, with an associated fitness value.
The velocity function of t + 1 iteration is represented as follows:


Vit+1 = wVit + C1 r1 Pi − Xit + C2 r2 Pg − Xit where Pi , Pg denote the best
position visited by particle i and the best position found by the swarm, w is an
inertia factor that varies over time, and r1 , r2 are the random values uniform on

[0, 1]. The transfer function denoted by T Vij helps in converting velocities to
probabilities and it is expressed as follows:


T Vij =

1
1 + eVij

(C.1)

this transfer function equally helps in updating each bit position as
follows:



 1
if
∪ (0, 1) < T Vij
Xij =

 0 otherwise
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(C.2)

Appendix D

Key Literature Related to Anomaly
Detection Approaches in CAV
Author(s)

Wang, Y.; Masoud
N.; Khojandi, A.

Cyber-security/anomaly aspects
investigated
Anomaly detection and
recovery in connected automated
vehicle sensors.

Study approach

Type of data

Identifies faults/ anomalies in
CAV networks. Detection approach
able to detect types of anomalies/
attacks. Approach is critcially affected
by uncertainty in noise processing

Observed-based approach
using AEKF with SVM

BSM data-set

Developed a methodology that can
seamlessly detect anomalies and their
source in real time.

CNN with kalman Filter based
approach.

key relevant findings

Van Wyk, F.; Wang,
Y.; Khojandi, A.;
Masoud, N.

Detection and identification
of anomaly in automated
vehicles

Godsmark, P.; Kirk,
B.; Gill, V. ; Flemming, B.

Deployment of smart protection
system to secure the external
communication of self driving
cars .

Detection of both grey hole and
rushing attack using the proposed
approach.

SVM and FFNN based
approach

Field experiment
using a vehicle CAN
data

Petit and Shladover

State of the art in identifying
potential cyber attacks on
automated vehicles

Identifies risks of various importance
in identifying GNSS spoofing and
fake message injection as the most
dangerous attack on AVs

Exploratory study

Literature review

Muter and Asaj

Detecting anomalies /attacks
for in-vehicle networks

Certain attacks on the CAN-bus of a
vehicle were detected using the proposed
methodology. Difficult to detect low - volume
attacks in CAN-bus of vehicles

Marchett

Detection of anomalous/
attacks for in-vehicle
networks

Detection of attacks on CAN-bus of
vehicles

Weimerskirch, A.;
Gaynier, R.

Overview of automatic
cybersecurity, challenges and
solution approach

Identifies the cyber challenges
and possible solutions

Petrillo, A.;
Pescape, A.;
Santini, S.

Addresses the problem
of cyber threat for a vehicle
platoon

Efficiency of adaptive
synchronization on the basis
of control algorithm to mitigate
adversary information. Approach
not scalable in high density network
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Signal Entropy

Signal Entropy

BSM data-set

Field experiment
using a vehicle CAN
data

Field experiment
with a vehicle CAN data

Exploratory study

Review of literature

Lyapunov-Krasovski
theory

Simulation using
PLEXE
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